



**Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe**  
commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

# Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe Options for Long-Term Solutions

Country case study

Germany

commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

Authors

**Dr. Steffen Wetzstein**

(Supported by the Project Team and MRI, Budapest)

January, 2023



**Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe**  
commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

## Table of contents

List of Figures.....	3
List of Tables.....	3
Acknowledgement.....	4
Introduction.....	5
1 General description of the country's affordable and social housing solutions.....	6
1.1 Typical housing provision forms.....	6
1.1.1 Context: history, economy, population and spatial dynamics.....	6
1.1.2 Housing system and tenure structure.....	8
1.1.3 Key tenure types.....	9
1.1.3.1 Owner-occupied housing.....	9
1.1.3.2 Market rental housing.....	9
1.1.3.3 Below-market rental/subsidised rental.....	10
1.1.3.4 Cooperative housing.....	10
1.1.3.5 Housing services within the asylum service system.....	10
1.1.3.6 Homeless provision services.....	10
1.1.4 Key housing stock characteristics.....	10
1.2 Main housing subsidy programs.....	12
1.2.1 Housing policy: the German 'social market economy' model.....	12
1.2.2 Key housing subsidy instruments.....	13
1.2.2.1 Social housing ('Soziale Wohnraumförderung').....	13
1.2.2.2 Cost for accommodation as part of the means-tested security benefit ('KdU').....	13
1.2.2.3 Housing allowance ('Wohngeld').....	14
1.2.2.4 Rent control for new contracts ('Mietpreisbremse').....	14
1.2.2.5 Construction benefit for families with children ('Baukindergeld').....	14
1.2.2.6 Retrofitting.....	14
1.3 Housing needs, affordability and other urban outcomes.....	15
1.3.1 Affordability.....	15
1.3.2 Security of tenure.....	15
1.3.3 Housing supply and demand of specific groups.....	16
1.3.4 Floor space.....	16
1.3.5 Housing mobility.....	17
1.3.6 Demography and migration.....	17
1.3.7 Housing construction.....	17
2 Field Work - Fact Collection.....	18
2.1 Main legal regulations on migrants and refugees.....	18
2.1.1 Temporary Protection Directive.....	18
2.1.2 Eligibility Criteria and Entitlements.....	19
2.1.3 Legal Circle Change ('Rechtskreiswechsel').....	20
2.2 Needs assessment.....	20
2.2.1 Size and profile of groups from Ukraine: previously arrived groups and refugees of the war.....	20
2.2.1.1 Previously arrived groups.....	20
2.2.1.2 Current Ukrainian Refugee Situation.....	21



## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe

commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

2.2.2	Spatial and accommodation-specific distribution of refugees fleeing from the war in Ukraine .....	22
2.2.3	Special characteristics of the current Ukrainian refugee arrivals and anticipating future need .....	25
2.3	Solutions to provide immediate and longer-term help for refugees .....	26
2.3.1	Immediate programs to provide accommodation and housing for refugees .....	26
2.3.2	Longer-term, more permanent solutions to provide accommodation and housing for refugees .....	28
2.4	Availability of further services ensuring integration .....	28
2.4.1	Basic social security and income-tested housing cost support .....	29
2.4.2	Access to further health services and social support schemes .....	29
2.4.3	Language acquisition and cultural orientation .....	29
2.4.4	Access to the labour market and training .....	29
2.4.5	Childcare and schooling .....	30
2.4.6	Social and cultural integration .....	30
3	Evaluation of the 'gap' between the needs of refugees and the offered housing solutions complemented with social services .....	31
3.1	Locational problems and mismatches .....	31
3.2	Legislation system .....	32
3.3	Financial framework .....	33
3.4	Main housing regime framework and feasibility of long-term solutions .....	33
3.5	Inadequacy of the physical composition of the housing stock .....	34
3.6	Cultural adequacy requirements .....	34
3.7	Lack of needed social assistance and other services .....	35
3.8	Information gaps related to effective decision-making .....	35
3.8.1	Social and housing data gaps .....	36
3.8.2	Forecast data gaps for risk mitigation .....	36
4	Main lessons and recommendations .....	38
4.1	General lessons .....	38
4.2	Recommendations .....	39
4.2.1	Increase affordable housing supply .....	39
4.2.2	Create strategic urban housing responses .....	41
4.2.3	Create responses in the rural context .....	42
4.2.4	Adjust tenancy regulations .....	44
5	Normative checklist for policy principles serving housing inclusion for UARs .....	46
5.1	Governance: legal frameworks, policy settings, effective incentives and state-level capacity .....	46
5.2	Actors, business models and practices .....	46
5.3	Housing-led integration at the whole-of-society level .....	47
6	Bibliography .....	49
6.1	I / WS - Interviews and Workshops .....	49
6.2	R - Nationally specific Reports .....	49
6.3	IS – International Studies and Reports .....	50
6.4	M - Media Communication .....	51
6.5	W – Additional Website/Social Media Links .....	52
6.6	A – Academic Publications .....	52



## List of Figures

Figure 1. Population development from 2013 to 2018.....	7
Figure 2. Housing completions according to building type and county group from 2005 to 2019 .....	8
Figure 3. Tenure structure in Germany by comparison (2020).....	9
Figure 4. Number of housing units per 1,000 inhabitants 2011 and 2021 .....	11
Figure 5. Vacant homes ratios 2001 and 2011 .....	11
Figure 6. Proportion of vacant homes by county type from 2012 to 2018.....	12
Figure 7. Share of those aged 18-34 still living with their parents (2008, %).....	15
Figure 8. Average number of rooms per person, 2020 .....	16
Figure 9. Overcrowding rate (%) .....	16
Figure 10. Housing construction per 1,000 dwellings, 2000-2021.....	17
Figure 11. Königsteiner Schlüssel (Spatial Distribution Key for Refugees in Germany (%)).....	24
Figure 12. Expected intra-national distribution of Ukrainian refugees according to the high-level scenario .....	32
Figure 13. Current Intra-National Distribution of Housing Supply .....	32
Figure 14. Housing-led Ukrainian refugee integration model.....	48

## List of Tables

Table 1. Tenure structure for Germany (2012 and 2020) and selected CEE countries.....	9
Table 2. Gaps/ Mismatches/ Tensions between Ukrainian Refugee Needs and offered Housing Solutions in Germany (Gap Summary) .....	37



**Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe**  
commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

## Acknowledgement

I acknowledge the general support and very helpful detailed feedback on earlier versions of this report by the Metropolitan Research Institute (MRI) in Budapest, and Ms. Adrienn Kiss, Independent Researcher, Budapest.



## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

### Introduction

After a short post-COVID recovery year, on February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine, devastating cities, destroying critical infrastructure and forcing millions of people to leave their homes. According to data provided by host governments to UNHCR, between February 24 and December 6, 2022, more than 7.8 million individuals who had fled Ukraine were registered across Europe. Due to the imposition of martial law, men between 18 and 60 are not allowed to leave Ukraine. Thus, 90% of those in need of international protection are women and children. By the beginning of December, more than 4.8 million people had registered for Temporary Protection or other legal status provided by the host countries' protection regimes in Europe. The war is still ongoing at the beginning of January 2023, and refugees' prospects of returning and starting reconstruction are increasingly delayed, and the aspirations of refugees are becoming more precarious.

This country case study is one output of a more extensive research effort commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International that was designed to examine immediate and longer-term accommodation/housing policy responses in five countries and, based on the findings, to define longer-term housing solutions that may lead to the better integration of refugees. The five countries include four neighbouring Ukraine (Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) and Germany, which was used as a benchmark for the other four countries in terms of general housing policy and refugee-related policy responses. Nevertheless, the German system was also analysed through a critical lens by comparing it to a well-functioning (ideal-type) affordable and human-rights-based housing system. The five country case studies are based on secondary data analysis, numerous interviews, document analyses, and fact collection. Their principal findings, on the one hand, are summarized in Country Fiches (one for each); on the other hand, a Comparative Report has been produced to help draw conclusions about the responses to the diverse housing needs of people fleeing the conflict of civil society, the private sector, local authorities, and humanitarian actors in the five EU countries. The Comparative Report also provides more general recommendations for Habitat for Humanity International advocacy activities regarding national and EU-level policy interventions.

The German case study is structured as follows. Chapter 1 analyses the main features of the German housing system and housing policy, comparing these with the situation in the other four countries. Chapter 2 summarises the results of the interviews and the fact-collection process. In doing so, it first shows the main regulatory background to the country's refugee policy and, secondly, the size and profile of refugee groups arriving from Ukraine. Then, it enumerates the forms of accommodation and housing provided for refugees, followed by a shorter description of other services. Chapter 3 concludes by specifying the main gaps (by comparing existing models for refugee housing solutions to an ideal approach). In Chapter 4, recommendations are made for developing more inclusive and longer-term housing solutions that take into account the specificities of the country's housing system and housing policy. Finally, Chapter 5 provides a normative checklist for policy principles serving housing inclusion of refugees from Ukraine.



# 1 General description of the country's affordable and social housing solutions

## 1.1 Typical housing provision forms

### 1.1.1 Context: history, economy, population and spatial dynamics

Germany has the largest national economy in Europe and the fourth largest economy by nominal GDP in the world, with a total income that currently stands at 35,480 EUR (December 2021).<sup>1</sup> The country accounts for 28% of the euro area economy. Its GDP per capita was 4.8 times higher in 2001 than the average GDP of the other four benchmark countries in this project. This is a gap that has narrowed to 2.8 times over the last 20 years. Germany is one of the largest exporters globally, with \$1810.93 billion worth of goods and services exported in 2019.<sup>2</sup> Main export products are vehicles, machinery, chemical goods, electronic products, electrical equipment, pharmaceutical, and transport equipment. The service sector contributes around 70% of total GDP, industry 29.1%, and agriculture 0.9%.

With a population of around 84 million, Germany is the most populous country in the five-country comparative project.<sup>3</sup> After years of a stagnating population trend, Germany's population has grown since 2014. On 30 June 2022, 2,882,000 more people were living in Germany than at the end of 2014. This increase was mainly due to forced migration in connection with war and violence in Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq in 2015/2016 and after Russia's attack on Ukraine. Germany is one of the largest receiving countries in terms of migration in Europe, with a net migration surplus of 6 million between 2000 and 2021, or 7% of its population. Population growth has been strongly concentrated in cities and metropolitan regions. Despite overall population gain, however, the proportion of the working-age population has decreased.

Germany's main recent housing-related challenge was connected to the country's unification, and the management of the related social conflicts caused extreme economic, political, and cultural differences. The government's strategy, basically, was to integrate the East German housing system into the well-operating West German system. In the evaluation of the programs, observers stated that the fiscal impact of the housing investment into the East German housing stock, accompanied by strong outmigration from East to West, caused particular problems. The literature points to the fact that the disequilibrium was caused by the 'post-reunification' housing policy that channelled large subsidies to housing stock. As a consequence of this over-investment, many vacancies were created in the 1990s and the 2000s. Since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008, however, we have witnessed the economic and population growth of East German cities such as Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden, Magdeburg, Erfurt, and Jena with emerging scarcities of affordable and accessible housing (Figure 1).

The German housing market is characterised by substantial regional differences, which are rooted in differing infrastructures, labour markets, educational opportunities, cultural peculiarities, historical developments of the local/regional economy, and interdependence between neighbouring regions (**Source: R13**). Regional differences in new residential construction are stark. In 2019, 293,000 homes were built in Germany – just under 85 % more than in 2009. An above-average number of new homes

---

<sup>1</sup> <https://tradingeconomics.com/germany/real-gdp-per-capita-eurostat-data.html>

<sup>2</sup> [https://www.destatis.de/EN/Themes/Economy/Foreign-Trade/\\_node.html](https://www.destatis.de/EN/Themes/Economy/Foreign-Trade/_node.html)



<sup>3</sup> [https://www.destatis.de/EN/Themes/Society-Environment/Population/Current-Population/\\_node.html](https://www.destatis.de/EN/Themes/Society-Environment/Population/Current-Population/_node.html)



were built in the growing big cities, predominantly in the form of apartments (Figure). In cities with over 500,000 inhabitants, an average of 33 homes per 10,000 inhabitants were constructed in 2019 – three times as many as in 2009. Other focal points of apartment-building construction are in the booming city-surrounding areas, tourist regions on the North Sea and Baltic coasts, and the Alps (**Source: R15**). Compared internationally, the number of construction starts of new residential properties per thousand citizens in Europe as of 2021 puts Germany, with 3 per 1,000, in the bottom section; much less than, for example, Poland with more than seven, and Austria with even more than ten.

Map 1

Population development 2013 to 2018



Source of data: BBSR housing market monitoring, Update of the Federal and State Population Statistics Geometric basis: Municipal associations, 31.12.2018 © GeoBasis-DE/BKG  
 Processing: J. Nielsen


**Figure 1. Population development from 2013 to 2018<sup>4</sup>**

<sup>4</sup> Source: R15 (BBSR, 2020)



Figure 3

**Housing completions from 2005 to 2019 according to building type and county type**




**Figure 2. Housing completions according to building type and county group from 2005 to 2019<sup>5</sup>**

1.1.2 *Housing system and tenure structure*

In contrast to the New Member States (NMSs), Germany has a balanced tenure structure with a significant rental sector (Figure 3). In fact, the country’s private rental sector (PRS) is the largest in Europe. Housing cooperatives - both owner and rental cooperatives - also play a key role in the tenure system. The public housing sector has been affected by privatisation as previous public housing stock has been sold to investor companies. The share of social housing is relatively small compared to in other countries and, importantly, has decreased over recent decades. At the same time, private rental has markedly increased in terms of its tenure share (Table 1). The latter trends have recently contributed to a general housing affordability problem, particularly in cities.

<sup>5</sup> Source: R15 (BBSR, 2020)



**Figure 3. Tenure structure in Germany by comparison (2020)<sup>6</sup>**

**Table 1. Tenure structure for Germany (2012 and 2020) and selected CEE countries<sup>7</sup>**

	Owner with mortgage	Own outright	Rent (private)	Rent (subsidized)	Total	Owner with mortgage	Own outright	Rent (private)	Rent (subsidized)	Total
	<b>2012</b>					<b>2020</b>				
<b>Germany</b>	28.0	25.2	38.7	8.1	100	31.4	19	43.3	6.3	100
<b>Hungary</b>	20.9	68.9	3.1	7.1	100	15.5	75.8	4.3	4.4	100
<b>Poland</b>	9.6	72.8	4	13.6	100	13.1	72.5	3.3	11.1	100
<b>Romania</b>	0.9	95.4	0.8	2.9	100	1.1	95	1.3	2.6	100
<b>Slovakia</b>	9.6	80.8	7.8	1.8	100	23.3	69	6.1	1.6	100

### 1.1.3 Key tenure types

#### 1.1.3.1 Owner-occupied housing

Overall, homeownership rates increased steadily over a long time in the twentieth century. Whereas approximately 32% of private households in West Germany owned their home in 1967, the figure was 53.4% (for all of Germany) in 2011. Since then, homeownership rates have decreased steadily to 49.5% in 2021.<sup>8</sup> This latter trend is possibly caused by high house prices (**Source: R13**).

#### 1.1.3.2 Market rental housing

Germany features the second highest PRS-tenure share in the world, just after Switzerland (see also **Source: A7**). The reasons can be found to a significant degree in nationally specific urban development and industrialisation histories (**Source: A10**). Urban areas are especially characterised by a high share of market rental housing. In rural areas, the share of rental housing is less and typically associated with lower-income groups.

<sup>6</sup> Source: Distribution of population by tenure status- EU-SILC survey [ILC\_LVHO02\_\_custom\_3360359]

<sup>7</sup> Source: Distribution of population by tenure status, EU-SILC survey [ILC\_LVHO02\_\_custom\_3360359]

<sup>8</sup> <https://www.statista.com/statistics/543381/house-owners-among-population-germany/>



## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

### 1.1.3.3 *Below-market rental/subsidised rental*

The stock of publicly funded housing has decreased at a rate of about 3% annually since 1990, caused by the predefined period of social targeting (allocation periods for social targeting may vary from 100 years to 10 years, depending on the funding scheme and legislation).

Social rental housing is associated with people with lower incomes. Many households are also recipients of Cost for Accommodation (*'Kosten der Unterkunft'*) (see section 2.4) and housing allowances.

### 1.1.3.4 *Cooperative housing*

Cooperative living - with the principle of mutuality at its core - makes living affordable and keeps costs down. It has two major forms:

- a) Co-operative ownership housing - co-operative ownership of housing with individual owner-like property rights, and
- b) Co-operative rental housing - all ownership rights (use, enjoy, and disposal) belong to the cooperative as a limited-liability corporate tax-exempt company.

### 1.1.3.5 *Housing services within the asylum service system*

In general, there are four types of accommodation for asylum seekers:

- (1) *Initial reception centres ('Erstaufnahmeeinrichtung')*, including particular types of centres such as arrival centres, special reception centres, and transit centres,
- (2) *Collective accommodation centres ('Gemeinschaftsunterkunft')*,
- (3) *Emergency shelters ('Notunterkunft')* were used in particular in 2015 and 2016 but were mainly closed down in 2017, with a few exceptions, and
- (4) *Decentralised/Dispersed accommodation ('dezentrale Unterbringung')*.

### 1.1.3.6 *Homeless provision services*

Although this sector is outside the housing tenure system, homeless service providers play an important role in addressing and managing the most extreme forms of housing exclusion. In Germany, providers served about 178,000 persons in temporary accommodation services or similar overnight accommodation facilities in 2022.<sup>9</sup> Some previous estimations estimated about 860,000 people in total (composed of about 420,000 homeless people and 440,000 recognised refugees experiencing homelessness in shelters for asylum seekers/mass accommodation) in 2016 (**Source: R13**).

## 1.1.4 *Key housing stock characteristics*


Almost three-quarters of all buildings and dwellings were built after 1948, with the 1960s and 1970s being the most productive decades. The eastern part of Germany has a larger proportion of buildings that were built before 1950 (approx. 38-54%) than the western part (approx. 17-41%). Sixty-seven percent of the buildings include one, and 16% two dwellings; 17% are multi-family houses containing three or more dwellings, 47% of the dwellings and 60 % of the living floor space are located in one-

---

<sup>9</sup> Source: DeStatis [https://www.destatis.de/EN/Press/2022/07/PE22\\_299\\_229.html](https://www.destatis.de/EN/Press/2022/07/PE22_299_229.html)

and two-family buildings, and 52% of the dwellings and 40 % of the living floor space are located in multi-family buildings.


Figure 4 indicates the high housing-unit-per-capita ratio for Germany with the average vacancy rate in comparison with some NMS. In the eastern part of Germany, the proportion of empty dwellings was 16 % in around 2010, corresponding to twice the national average.



Beyond the east-west difference, recent vacancy trends for Germany (Figure 6) show that the vacancy rate in rural areas is around double the rate in cities. Moreover, there was a slight but steady increase in vacant properties in rural areas throughout the 2010s.

<sup>10</sup> Source: Housing Statistics of Europe 2014, Eurostat Population change - Demographic balance and crude rates at national level [DEMO\_GIND]; Source: Hypostat 2021 [https://hypo.org/app/uploads/sites/3/2021/11/HYPOSTAT-2021\\_vdef.pdf](https://hypo.org/app/uploads/sites/3/2021/11/HYPOSTAT-2021_vdef.pdf)

<sup>11</sup> Source: Eurostat Census Hub, Census 2011. T, Housing Statistics of Europe 2014



Note: Recalculated 31.1.2020

Source of data: BBSR Estimate of vacant homes, based on the vacancy data of the 2011 building and housing census

© BBSR Bonn 2020

**Figure 6. Proportion of vacant homes by county type from 2012 to 2018<sup>12</sup>**

## 1.2 Main housing subsidy programs

### 1.2.1 Housing policy: the German 'social market economy' model

The German housing system can be described as a mixed market wherein 1) privately owned stock is rented to individuals (60%), and 2) people live in their own property (40%). The rental sector is characterised by a large diversity of landlords; e.g., there are a great number of owners that only own a small number of units ('Kleinvermieter' – 37%), whereas there are also big companies with tens of thousands of rented units (23%). Close to 5% of housing within this sector is governed by housing cooperatives, similarly to the size of the segment that is managed as social housing.

Housing policy and its regulation may be viewed according to the paradigm of the traditional German 'social market economy,' where the idea is that the state only intervenes in the market if the market does not work properly and where housing is seen both as an 'economic good' and a 'social good.' At the same time, the welfare state principle is also important. This principle rests on three pillars:

(1) Since Germany has a large proportion of renters, a key feature of housing policy is the *regulation* of all aspects concerning the relationship between tenant and landlord (prices, refurbishment, termination of contracts, eviction, etc.). Because of rising land and housing prices in recent times, the unbalancing of – in particular – urban rental markets has occurred. In response, a rent brake policy was introduced, although the effectiveness of this is in doubt.

(2) To respond to affordability problems, the state actively helps individuals on the *demand side* by paying housing benefit. This pillar has been significantly strengthened by the introduction of Cost of

<sup>12</sup> Source: R15 (BBSR, 2020)



## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

Accommodation ('Kosten der Unterkunft'/(KdU) together with the reform of the Housing Allowance ('Wohngeld') (see subsection on 'Housing Subsidy Instruments' below).

(3) When structural problems with the housing/rental market are temporarily perceived (affordability and availability issues), *supply-side-related* instruments are strengthened; otherwise, this pillar has been reduced to a minimum. Since the German constitution was modified in 2006, the Federal Government may no longer subsidise supply-side measures for social housing after the end of an interim period. This is caused by a shift in responsibility to the Federal States<sup>13</sup> that are now in the position to provide supply-side subsidies. However, a much stronger federal commitment to supply-side measures again has been promised recently (**Source: R10**).

### 1.2.2 Key housing subsidy instruments

#### 1.2.2.1 Social housing ('Soziale Wohnraumförderung')

Regarding social rental housing, the subsidy is based on the following approach: based on a concrete building / cost plan for dwellings (mostly new buildings or refurbishments), investors receive a supply-side subsidy, mainly in the form of credits at reduced interest rates or in the form of grants. Therefore, the investor has to rent the dwelling to the entitled households (target groups) at below market rent. The duration of this so-called 'binding' use, the concrete allocation method for the dwellings, as well as the rent regulations, depend on the regulations of the Federal States. The household-specific eligibility criteria depend on the regulations of the regions.

Until recently, the political debate has focused on the shrinking number of subsidised dwellings and the problems of developing new occupancy rights for social housing. The reasons lie in the lack of developable areas, especially agglomerations, as well as the low-interest rates that disincentivised social housing programmes – at least until 2022. Furthermore, the federal level is concerned that financial resources are not adequately allocated by the Federal States (especially in former years that involved less tension on the market) and are not appropriately complemented with the 'own' resources of the Federal States (**Source: R13**).

#### 1.2.2.2 Cost for accommodation as part of the means-tested security benefit ('KdU')

This means-tested instrument is designed for households without income or assets. It is part of the basic security scheme<sup>14</sup> for job seekers who are able to work (Book II of the Social Code), people in need who are unable to work, and people over the age of 65 who are in need (Book XII of the Social Code). Recipients of basic security benefits are legally entitled to be reimbursed for their accommodation expenses within a specific housing budget threshold. This threshold depends on the size of the household as well as the rental conditions of the local market. The limit is determined by the local social agencies - for those unable to work - and the nationally governed Jobcenters - for those who are able to work.

---

<sup>13</sup> The German state consists of three hierarchical layers: Federal Government/Administration ('Bundesregierung/Bund') on national level, Federal States ('Bundesländer') on an intermediate level and Municipalities and Communities ('Städte und Gemeinden') on a local level

<sup>14</sup> [https://www.deutsche-rentenversicherung.de/DRV/DE/Rente/In-der-Rente/Grundsicherung/grundsicherung\\_node.html#:~:text=Die%20Grundsicherung%20f%C3%BCr%20Bed%C3%BCrftige,nach%20dem%20Sozialhilferecht%20gezahlt%20werden.](https://www.deutsche-rentenversicherung.de/DRV/DE/Rente/In-der-Rente/Grundsicherung/grundsicherung_node.html#:~:text=Die%20Grundsicherung%20f%C3%BCr%20Bed%C3%BCrftige,nach%20dem%20Sozialhilferecht%20gezahlt%20werden.)



## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

This means-tested benefit should facilitate access to housing of a basic standard. Substandard dwellings without baths or heating are excluded. Recipients of this social benefit are free to choose a dwelling and conclude their own rental contracts but can only expect cost reimbursement by the local Jobcenter up to the given threshold.

### 1.2.2.3 Housing allowance ('Wohngeld')

This instrument is designed for low-income households (tenants and homeowners) for whom the basic security scheme (see above) would apply, because of their housing costs. The amount of housing allowance is calculated based on a specific formula and depends negatively on income and positively on rent level and household size.

To avoid subsidising overly expensive rental arrangements, it has a ceiling which depends on the household size and the local market conditions. Recipients of housing allowance must have a calculated entitlement to payments of at least 10 euros. In other words, households must have some income – even if this is very little. They must not receive basic security services (in this case, they qualify for the 'Cost of Accommodation' instrument), and their financial and tangible assets must not exceed a specified limit.

### 1.2.2.4 Rent control for new contracts ('Mietpreisbremse')

While in general only ongoing rental contracts are governed by the controlled adjustment of rents, this instrument affects the price level of new rental contracts in selected areas. The legal basis is formulated in Civil Law (§ 556d *Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch* (BGB)). These areas can be selected by enactments of the particular Federal States when the rental market is under pressure. Landlords are restricted to renting out property at a price level of a maximum of 10% above the local reference rent ('*ortsübliche Vergleichsmiete*') that governs existing rent adjustments.

Basically, the described instrument is relevant for all tenants/landlords-contracts in selected areas. The regulation does not apply to newly built or first-time rented dwellings; (totally) refurbished dwellings; and dwellings that already had a higher rental price. There is huge debate regarding the effects of this instrument (**Source: R13, Source: R17**).

### 1.2.2.5 Construction benefit for families with children ('Baukindergeld')

The construction benefit for families with children involves financial support for families with children and single parents for their first purchase of an owner-occupied residential property. Home ownership and its investment effects are considered to stabilise existing urban structures, especially in structurally weak regions. Yet, labour force mobility may be undermined (**Source: R13**).

This subsidy can be obtained by households with a maximum household income of 90,000 euros with one child plus 15,000 euros for each additional child. The benefit entails a stipend per child totalling 12,000 euros (1,200 euros per year for ten years) for the construction or purchase of owner-occupied residential property.

### 1.2.2.6 Retrofitting

Another important domain of intervention is retrofitting, or the process of making changes to existing buildings to reduce energy consumption and emissions. At the federal level, the KfW-group (a German government-owned development bank) has promoted energy-efficient construction and refurbishments as well as age-appropriate conversions of homes by means of providing loans with



repayment subsidies,<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, the market introduction of renewable or innovative technologies (e.g. fuel cells for heating) has been promoted by KfW and BAFA (Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control).

### 1.3 Housing needs, affordability and other urban outcomes


#### 1.3.1 Affordability

Affordability represents an overarching contemporary challenge with severe social and economic consequences (**Source: IS1**). The difference between Germany's average house prices and that of the four NMS is more than double, although smaller than the difference in GDP, indicating that the *affordability problem* is greater in the NMSs than in Germany.

In Germany, the owner-occupied tenure segment increases with household income (and age). The share of owner-occupation in bigger cities is lower than in smaller cities or rural areas (only about 30 % of owner-occupation in bigger cities to 45 % in general). Due to rising land prices in agglomerations, building costs, and additional acquisition costs, prospective homeowners are increasingly forced to move to the periphery of cities or refrain from acquiring housing assets (**Source: R13**).

Compared to other countries, Germany's lower- and middle-income groups are now strongly affected by affordability problems (**Source: A2/A8**). The rent price level has increased, especially in bigger cities contributing to the lack of affordable dwellings. For example, in 2015, 15.6 % of all households had a housing cost overburden rate of more than 40 % (in 2010, it was 14.5%).

An indirect indicator of the affordability problem is the percentage of young people living with their parents (Figure 7). According to data for 2008, Germany does better than most other countries. More than half of young people aged 18-34 in the New Member States live with their parents (in Slovakia, this figure is almost 70%), while in Germany, this share is only 40%.



**Figure 7. Share of those aged 18-34 still living with their parents (2008, %)<sup>16</sup>**

#### 1.3.2 Security of tenure

Security of tenure is considered a central topic concerning land and housing internationally (**Source: A3**). The proportion of owners with a mortgage or loan in Germany is rather stable, at about 26 % of all households (about half of the owner-occupied housing). The relatively small share of mortgaged

<sup>15</sup> <https://www.kfw.de/inlandsfoerderung/Privatpersonen/Neubau/index-2.html>

<sup>16</sup> Source: EU-SILC survey (online data code: ILC\_MDHO06A)

homeownership in Germany makes this tenure type more secure than in more financialised housing systems (**Source: A5**) because of the limited exposure to potentially volatile market conditions.

In general, rental housing in Germany is understood as a secure tenure with regulated rent increases. Nevertheless, rent increases in connection with refurbishment is a debated issue. There is a distinction between modernisations that reach current standards, which can cause rent increases, and so-called luxury modernisations, which are understood as landlords’ deliberate strategy of forcing the termination of a contract with a tenant. This way, a new rental contract can be made with a new tenant and a new rental price.

### 1.3.3 Housing supply and demand of specific groups

Large families with a migration background, single parents with (several) children, and people with health-related problems particularly face issues accessing the housing market.


Concerning availability, in the owner-occupation sector, availability problems are connected with the lack of land for construction in agglomeration areas; a situation that promotes greenfield construction outside the core urban areas (**Source: R13**).

Regarding rental housing, bigger cities have a lack of smaller dwellings. While about half of the households in bigger cities are single households, only 13.9 % of dwellings are under 45 square meters, and only a further 22.9 % are between 45 and 60 square meters in size.<sup>17</sup>

Regarding technical adequacy, a study from 2011 concludes that only about 570,000 dwellings are adjusted to the physical needs of aged persons, whereas 83 % of 11 million elderly households are in need of such dwellings.<sup>18</sup>

### 1.3.4 Floor space

Comparative housing floor space data show that Germany does relatively well on indicators such as overcrowding rate and rooms per person (Figure 9).



<sup>17</sup> Source: Hans Böckler Stiftung 2017: Wohnverhältnisse in Deutschland - eine Analyse der sozialen Lage in 77 Großstädten; database: Micro Census 2014

<sup>18</sup> Source: BBSR 2011: Wohnen im Alter. Marktprozesse und wohnungspolitischer Handlungsbedarf. Forschungen, Heft 147

<sup>19</sup> Source: EU-SILC survey [ILC\_LVHO03\_\_custom\_1513490]

<sup>20</sup> Source: Overcrowding rate by age, sex and poverty status – total population – EU-SILC survey [ILC\_LVHO05A\_\_custom\_3397213]

### 1.3.5 Housing mobility

In general, housing mobility in the New Member States is much lower than in the more developed countries of Europe. In Germany, the rate of people moving in the last five years is 21.9%, while in all other countries except Poland, less than 10% of the population has moved; at the same time, the Polish figure is less than 50% of the German figure. The low mobility rates are linked with constrained housing finance products.


### 1.3.6 Demography and migration

In recent years, significantly high migration rates have fuelled population growth in Germany. At its previous peak in 2015, there was a record migration influx of more than 1.1 million people. In addition, fertility rates, which have been extremely low compared to those of other European countries, increased from 1.4 to 1.6 children per woman.

For over a decade, Germany has seen population growth in large cities and metropolitan areas. Furthermore, housing preferences are shifting to an urban lifestyle. These demographic dynamics mean an overall increase in the numbers of households with decreasing household sizes and ongoing urban housing market pressure.

### 1.3.7 Housing construction

Comparative statistics on new housing construction highlight that - compared to the early 2000s – a relatively low level of construction adds to pre-existing housing shortages (Figure 10). This may affect housing shortages, particularly in cities and in subsidised housing segments.



**Figure 10. Housing construction per 1,000 dwellings, 2000-2021<sup>21</sup>**

<sup>21</sup> Source: Hypostat 2021 [https://hypo.org/app/uploads/sites/3/2021/11/HYPOSTAT-2021\\_vdef.pdf](https://hypo.org/app/uploads/sites/3/2021/11/HYPOSTAT-2021_vdef.pdf)



## 2 Field Work - Fact Collection

### 2.1 Main legal regulations on migrants and refugees

#### 2.1.1 Temporary Protection Directive

The 2001 EU Temporary Protection Directive (2001/55/EC) was transposed into German national legislation by the Immigration Act (*Gesetz zur Steuerung und Begrenzung der Zuwanderung und zur Regelung des Aufenthalts und der Integration von Unionsbürgern und Ausländern (Zuwanderungsgesetz)*) that came into effect in 2005.<sup>22</sup> Article 24(1) (*Aufenthaltsgewährung zum vorübergehenden Schutz*) of the Immigration Act stipulates that residence permits may be issued for foreigners recognised as temporary protection holders by decision of the Council of the European Union in accordance with the Temporary Protection Directive.<sup>23</sup> Pursuant to Article 24(3), people admitted to the territory of Germany on the basis of the Temporary Protection Directive shall be distributed across the country, and an admission quota system might also be established.<sup>24</sup> The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (*Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF)*) is in charge of the distribution of temporary protection holders at the Federal State level, and should follow the logic of the distribution of asylum-seekers.<sup>25</sup>

According to Article 24(5) of the Immigration Act, beneficiaries of temporary protection shall have access to employment as well as self-employment.<sup>26</sup> Social Code 2<sup>nd</sup> Book and Social Code 12<sup>th</sup> Book permit the equivalent level of welfare benefits for Ukrainian temporary protection status holders to what nationals could get.<sup>27</sup> This means a 15% increase in the amount of financial assistance compared to what asylum-seekers could be eligible for under the Asylum Seekers Benefits Act (*Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz (AsylbLG)*).<sup>28</sup> This seems to indicate preferential treatment of those

---

<sup>22</sup> Gesetz zur Steuerung und Begrenzung der Zuwanderung und zur Regelung des Aufenthalts und der Integration von Unionsbürgern und Ausländern (Zuwanderungsgesetz). Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 2004, Teil I, Nr. 41., 5 August 2004. [Law to Control and Limit Immigration and to Regulate the Residence and Integration of Union Citizens and Foreigners (Immigration Law). Federal Law Gazette 2004, Part I, No. 41, 5 August 2004.] [https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav#\\_bgbl\\_%2F%2F%5B%40attr\\_id%3D%27bgbl104s1950.pdf%27%5D\\_\\_1664913525860](https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav#_bgbl_%2F%2F%5B%40attr_id%3D%27bgbl104s1950.pdf%27%5D__1664913525860); Overview of national measures regarding employment and social security of displaced persons coming from Ukraine. Country Fiche – Germany, European Labour Authority, July 2022. Last accessed: 9 November 2022. <https://www.ela.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-07/DE-country-fiche-ela-national-measures-ukraine.pdf>; COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof. Official Journal of the European Communities, 7 August 2001. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32001L0055&from=EN>

<sup>23</sup> Gesetz zur Steuerung und Begrenzung der Zuwanderung und zur Regelung des Aufenthalts und der Integration von Unionsbürgern und Ausländern (Zuwanderungsgesetz). Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 2004, Teil I, Nr. 41., 5 August 2004. Artikel 24(1)

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.* Artikel 24(3)

<sup>25</sup> Website of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF): [www.bamf.de](http://www.bamf.de)

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.* Artikel 24(5)

<sup>27</sup> Overview of national measures regarding employment and social security of displaced persons coming from Ukraine. Country Fiche – Germany, European Labour Authority, July 2022.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*



## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

fleeing Russia's war on Ukraine compared to people of other nationalities seeking international protection.

Upon arrival on the territory of Germany, people fleeing Russia's war against Ukraine have to apply for temporary protection in order to get accommodated by the border authorities under a specifically designed reception programme. First places of reception are run by the federal state, and people have very limited freedom to decide to which state, municipality or facility they would like to move. In fact, only in cases of employment are they allowed to move further.<sup>29</sup> Humanitarian needs are addressed at the reception facilities until long-term accommodation is found for them.

### 2.1.2 Eligibility Criteria and Entitlements

The following groups of people displaced by Russia's war on Ukraine are eligible for temporary protection in Germany.<sup>30</sup>

- Ukrainian citizens living in Ukraine until 24 February 2022, as well as their family members
- Third-country nationals and stateless persons who were granted refugee or any other international protection status under national law who have left Ukraine since 24 February 2022, as well as their family members
- Third-country nationals and stateless persons legally residing in Ukraine prior to 24 February 2022 who are unable to return to their country of origin in a safe and durable manner, as well as their family members
- People who already fled Ukraine prior to 24 February 2022 or travelled to another EU country for any reason and cannot return to Ukraine due to the circumstances arising from the war
- Ukrainian citizens already residing in Germany if their residence permit will expire soon

The latter clause is significant in relation to protecting the safety and upholding the human rights of the members of the Ukrainian diaspora community and might become increasingly relevant over time. Compared to the legislation in the other four countries under research, Germany's is the only one that explicitly states that Ukrainian citizens who have migrated from Ukraine to Germany for reasons unrelated to Russia's war may also access temporary protection. Without this specification, people with an expired residence permit might find themselves in legal limbo.

#### **Beneficiaries of temporary protection may be entitled to the following rights in Germany:**

- Residence and permission to work
- Information related to the temporary protection
- Access to welfare assistance and means of subsistence (e.g., accommodation)
- Access to healthcare services
- Access to welfare and medical assistance for those with special needs
- Access to education
- Family reunification<sup>31</sup>

---

<sup>29</sup> Information on temporary protection in Germany. European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), May 2022. [https://euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-06/Booklet\\_Germany\\_EN.pdf](https://euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-06/Booklet_Germany_EN.pdf)

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*



## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

Regular cash assistance for a single person initially amounted to EUR 449 per month, and EUR 404 for an adult partner, while other adults residing in the same household could receive EUR 360 each.<sup>32</sup> Beneficiaries of temporary protection are also entitled to full access to the public health insurance system.<sup>33</sup> For more information, see also **Source: IS5**.

Since 1 June 2022, after the Legal Circle Change (*'Rechtskreiswechsel'*), Ukrainian Refugees (UARs) can be supported by the German Basic Security scheme – the same entitlement as German people have. Refugees receive slightly more money because of this situation. Please refer to the next section for more specific information.

### 2.1.3 Legal Circle Change (*'Rechtskreiswechsel'*)

From June 1, 2022, Ukrainian refugees can access rights according to the Social Act. This change in the legal context is called the *Rechtskreiswechsel*<sup>34</sup> (Legal Circle Change). Whereas previously, social agencies would have dealt with the new arrivals according to Asylum Law, now either the Jobcenters (for those able to work) or the social agencies of the municipalities/communities (all other cases) are in charge of paying the support according to German Social Law. The refugees will now receive slightly more support via the latter two institutions. The other great advantage is that financial and integration support is now combined and available in one organisational bundle.

The bureaucratic challenges are significant, however, and little is known about how this affects the refugees themselves. On the one hand, the sheer number of refugees needs to be administered; on the other hand, Jobcenter applications require more application time and documents. In Erfurt, the Legal Circle Change was prepared carefully by the relevant agencies and staff members via multiple video and telephone conferences in the preceding weeks (**Source: I3**).

## 2.2 Needs assessment

### 2.2.1 Size and profile of groups from Ukraine: previously arrived groups and refugees of the war

#### 2.2.1.1 Previously arrived groups

Germany, besides Poland, is one of the key European receiving countries of Ukrainian refugees. Even before Russia's war against Ukraine, approximately 331,000 people with a Ukrainian migration background were living in Germany, 64% of whom were women.<sup>35</sup> Most Ukrainian people before the war lived in Berlin (13,000) and Munich (7,000). Many were attracted to the agglomerations in the west and south of the country. Compared to other migrants, they are more evenly distributed across Germany. These spatial patterns partly stem from the quota refugee settlements of Ukrainian Jewish

---

<sup>32</sup> Overview of national measures regarding employment and social security of displaced persons coming from Ukraine. Country Fiche – Germany, European Labour Authority, July 2022.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> Legal Circle Change (*'Rechtskreiswechsel'*) means refugees will subsequently be financially and integration-wise supported mainly by the German Jobcenters, and on special occasions by the Social Agencies

<sup>35</sup> Statistisches Bundesamt (2021), Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund - Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus 2020, page 58, available under [https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Bevoelkerung/Migration-Integration/Publikationen/Downloads-Migration/migrationshintergrund-2010220217004.pdf?\\_\\_blob=publicationFile](https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Bevoelkerung/Migration-Integration/Publikationen/Downloads-Migration/migrationshintergrund-2010220217004.pdf?__blob=publicationFile)





## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

people in the 1990s. The relative share is higher in East Germany because other foreigners are underrepresented there.<sup>36</sup>

Most pre-war Ukrainians already have a permanent residence permit. This means that they have lived in Germany for at least five years already. Forty seven percent of those who got a temporary residence permit arrived via family reunification, 22% as refugees, and 13% for employment reasons. A comparison of household income for different relevant migration source countries reveals that Ukrainian households earned less in 2019 both in relation to those in ex-USSR countries and the host population. Thirty-four percent of Ukrainian households earned less than 1,500 EUR per month, whereas for households from the ex-USSR (without Ukraine), this figure was 27%; for Kazakhstan, 19% and for the host population, 23%.<sup>37</sup>

Viewed from a recent historical perspective, accommodation outcomes for refugees in Germany demonstrate that available spaces categorized as collective accommodation increased steadily in the years leading up to the 2015 European refugee crisis. In fact, the number almost broke even with that of places available in decentralised/dispersed apartments in 2013 (when 110,000 decentral accommodation places existed) and 90,000 in collective accommodation (**Source: R4**). Unfortunately, no updated data exists on this matter, but we know that the short-term accommodation dynamics for the arriving Ukrainian refugees differ greatly from the previous situation.

### 2.2.1.2 Current Ukrainian Refugee Situation

Between the start of Russia's war on Ukraine and 8 November 2022, 1,024,841 refugees from Ukraine (UARs) have been registered at the Foreigner Central Registration ('*Ausländerzentralregister*'/AZR)<sup>38</sup>:

- Approx. 61% - temporary protection (§ 24 Immigration Act)
- Approx. 17% - applied for temporary protection (§ 24 Immigration Act)
- Approx. 5 % - no settlement status yet

These figures, however, do not incorporate the possibility of refugees having moved on to other countries or returned home to Ukraine. This is because Ukrainian refugees can enter the European Union without a visa.

Ninety-seven percent of Ukrainian refugees are from Ukraine, and 3% are from other third countries. Sixty-five percent of UARs are adults, while 35% are children and youth under the age of 18 (351,000). One hundred and thirty-five thousand children are of primary school age (6-11). Seventy-two percent of adult refugees are women (470,000), and 28% are men (184,000) (see AZR statistics above).

A survey from April 2022 revealed that the average age of the refugees was 38 years.

The profile of the UAR households is thus characterised by vulnerable groups (women and children). Up to one-third of refugees have a disability (physical, psychological-mental, or intellectual) (**Source:**

---

<sup>36</sup> Panagiotidis, Jannis (2021): „Postsowjetische Migration in Deutschland“, Beltz Juventa Verlag. Short version available under [https://mediendienst-integration.de/fileadmin/Dateien/MDI\\_Expertise\\_Postsowjetische\\_Migration.pdf](https://mediendienst-integration.de/fileadmin/Dateien/MDI_Expertise_Postsowjetische_Migration.pdf)

<sup>37</sup> <https://mediendienst-integration.de/migration/flucht-asyl/ukrainische-fluechtlinge.html>, Analysis of MicroCensus 2019

<sup>38</sup> Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge – Forschungsdatenzentrum: Daten aus dem Ausländerregister (access after registration), see <https://www.bamf.de/DE/Themen/Forschung/Forschungsdatenzentrum/DatenAZR/daten-azr-node.html>;





## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

**IS6).** Anecdotal evidence points to the fact that many refugee households come with a pet, such as a cat or a dog.

Important is the expectation mismatch issue, as many refugees want to return home after Russia's war on Ukraine ends but are – for now – forced to stay and integrate in Germany (**Source: IS6**).

### 2.2.2 *Spatial and accommodation-specific distribution of refugees fleeing from the war in Ukraine*

#### **Accommodation-specific distribution**

According to ministerial and civil society sources, many UARs in Germany were accommodated via family and friends. In fact, in April 2022, Germany accommodated more refugees (41%) on the basis of this informal type of accommodation than neighbouring Poland (34%). In Poland, 15% of UARs were accommodated in hotels, and another 15% in rented apartments, whereas for Germany, those figures are only 7% and 10% (**Source: W1**).

In December 2022, 74% of respondents were living in private accommodation, and only 9% were in publicly provided group housing for refugees. For only 16% of UARs, the current place of residence was determined by state authorities (**Source: R16**). In the meantime, some of those privately accommodated people had to switch to state-based accommodation because they could not find their own apartment.

From a federal state perspective, Bavarian statistics indicate that in late August 2022, 28% of UARs were housed in state or communal residences, while 72% were in private residences or staying with friends and relatives (**Source: M1**). From neighbouring Baden-Württemberg, similar numbers were shared; approximately 80% of the refugees were privately accommodated.

In Erfurt, the capital city of Thüringen (215,000 inhabitants), in early October 2022, the total number of UARs was 2,959 (460 of those have moved back or moved on to another location). 1,666 UARs were housed in private accommodation (flats), 491 UARs in collective accommodation, and 332 UARs in emergency accommodation. The latter includes the use of five sports halls in the city, an issue that nevertheless is sensitive, so the exact locations are not being revealed (**Source: I3**).

Because of the importance of decentralised/dispersed distribution dynamics for short-term UAR accommodation (**Source: R3**), it is critical to know *how* distribution outcomes occurred. In this context, the pivotal role of the *Ukrainian diaspora* needs to be highlighted. They have been acting as first-line responders as well as contact and information points. This means that this community has also been relevant in relation to the issue of accommodation. The diaspora consists not only of pre-2022 Ukrainian arrivals but also of Russian nationals opposing the war (**Source: 1B**).

In Erfurt, the diaspora played an immensely important role. Because it has a sizeable community of relatively recently arrived Ukrainians, the Association of Ukrainian Compatriots ('*Verband der Ukrainischen Landsmannschaft*') was pivotal for decentralised/dispersed accommodation distribution. Moreover, the sizeable Jewish parish attracted people of their own community from Ukraine. Within the diaspora community, powerful, well-connected individuals act as influential gatekeepers. For example, a prominent leader of the Ukrainian diaspora community acted as a magnet and gatekeeper and was initially very important for getting people there and providing them with necessities (**Source: I3**).




## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

### **Spatial Refugee Distribution**

Germany is a strongly decentralised country with substantial autonomy for Federal States, municipalities, and communities. Ukrainian refugees who cannot take advantage of private solutions have to be accommodated via the state. The state-based distribution system is called the *Königsteiner Schlüssel* (KS; Figure 11). According to this mechanism, every Federal State takes a particular proportion of people based on a formula that takes into account population size and tax intake. This distribution model is also applied to local distribution within the Federal States (**Source: 13**). The Central responsibility for the use of this model sits with the Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees and the principles of the § 24 (3) Immigration Act (*Aufenthaltsgesetz*).

In 2022, this model has been assisted by innovative new digital support that lubricates dispersion and customises outcomes. The digital tool 'FREE' (*Fachanwendung zur Registerführung, Erfassung und Erstverteilung zum vorübergehenden Schutz*) ensures fully automated distribution. Also, it allows the circumstances of refugees – for example, family situation – to be taken into account. However, the KS mechanism has been criticised for being too crude and inflexible in recent years.

In the case of the Ukrainian refugees, this mechanism is – so far – of more limited importance. Because of their initial protection status as temporary protection holders, and because after the *Legal Circle Change* ('*Rechtskreiswechsel*') under Jobcenter and Social Agency programmes they are treated like German citizens, they enjoy much greater freedom to choose their location of residence in comparison to asylum seekers from other countries. This seems to be another indicator of the preferential treatment of people fleeing Russia's war against Ukraine. Nevertheless, with rising refugee numbers expected in the coming winter months and private accommodation capacity reaching clear limits by the end of 2022, the principles and mechanisms of state-led refugee dispersion are likely to become topical again.



**Figure 11. Königsteiner Schlüssel (Spatial Distribution Key for Refugees in Germany (%))<sup>39</sup>**

According to figures from September 2022, the following Federal States accommodate most of the Ukrainian refugees:

- North Rhine-Westphalia (Nordrhein-Westfalen): 211,000 persons (end of June 2022: 176,000)
- Bavaria (Bayern): 153,000 (end of June 2022: 150,000)
- Baden-Württemberg (Baden-Württemberg): 125,000 (end of June 2022: 116,000)
- Lower Saxony (Niedersachsen): 100,000
- Hesse (Hessen): 84,000

Although all Federal States have expanded their reception infrastructure, communities are currently reaching their limits in relation to accepting additional refugees. One reason is the reduced support from the Federal Government/Administration – despite growing refugee numbers in 2022 (**Source: M27**). It is noteworthy, though, that data inconsistencies also make decision-making more difficult. Some Federal States rely on data from the central register of foreigners ('*Ausländerzentralregister*'), whereas others work with the numbers provided on the basis of registered persons in reception centres.

However, in the past implementation processes associated with this mechanism have been uneven as refugees during previous mass arrivals tended to concentrate in the west and north of Germany. Also, we are currently seeing a rather strong move towards metropolitan centres such as Berlin, Munich,

<sup>39</sup> Source: 2015 - Distribution Key (,Verteilungsschlüssel') ([https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Abbildung-4-Verteilungsquoten-von-Asylsuchenden-nach-dem-Koenigsteiner-Schluessel-in-2015\\_fig1\\_315112043](https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Abbildung-4-Verteilungsquoten-von-Asylsuchenden-nach-dem-Koenigsteiner-Schluessel-in-2015_fig1_315112043))



## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

and Cologne. Besides the attraction to join relatives and diaspora communities in larger cities, a negative image of living in the countryside without water and electricity derived from the Ukrainian experience of life is reported to be hampering distribution towards rural areas and smaller cities (**Source: 1B**). Moreover, distribution towards the countryside is also more challenging because it is generally hard to make people move into small settlements, towns and villages, and it seems to be particularly difficult to provide age and disability-aligned housing in rural areas (**Source: I2**).

### 2.2.3 *Special characteristics of the current Ukrainian refugee arrivals and anticipating future need*

In order to understand the accommodation needs of UARs, one must fully acknowledge the particular situation of Ukrainian refugees in 2022. Many commentators stress that the situation in 2022 differs significantly from that associate with previous refugee movements and arrivals, such as during the so-called European refugee crisis of 2015 (**Source: M9**).

The following characteristics apply:

- Relatively safe land routes and partly motorised refugees and train connections allowed the quick, dynamic and large-scale inflow of people immediately after the start of the war – with almost no preparation time in the receiving countries
- Border authorities allow Ukrainian people to enter the territory unrestrictedly while irregular migrants and asylum-seekers from other countries are generally pushed back unlawfully, e.g., at the border areas of Hungary-Serbia and Poland-Belarus<sup>40</sup>
- The local population made enormous effort to mobilise their own resources in order to respond to the needs of people in need of protection and humanitarian support
- Considerably heightened role and involvement of the private sector and companies
- Possibility of (forward and backward) pendulum movement (reasons include getting medication, saying farewell, curiosity) (Source: I1A)
- Overall, housing and integration demand is plagued by uncertainty and fluctuation
- The dominance of vulnerable refugee groups (women, children, disabled people), yet highly educated people
- Almost permanent pressure on authorities in charge of responses
- “In the beginning, we did not know how many had come” (Source: I1A) – ongoing data challenges

Two factors have been pivotal in the early accommodation and integration of UARs in Germany. The (still) strong *welcome culture* momentum, and - in alignment with the approach of the Global Compact on Refugees (to which Germany is a signatory state) - a *whole-of-society partnership approach*<sup>41</sup> to solution finding (**Source: A9**). Concerning the former, the fact that refugees have been construed as legitimate victims of war has contributed as much as the proximate culture and the existence of multiple vulnerabilities of the refugees. Regarding the latter, *crisis management has been able to build on the power of an agile and innovative civil society as well as a relatively strong coordinating and*

---

<sup>40</sup> Prantl, J.: Generous, but Equal Treatment? Anti-Discrimination Duties of States Hosting Refugees Fleeing Ukraine. *Odysseus Network, EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy Blog*, 4 May 2022. <https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/generous-but-equal-treatment-anti-discrimination-duties-of-states-hosting-refugees-fleeing-ukraine/>

<sup>41</sup> <https://www.unhcr.org/5c658aed4> and <https://globalcompactrefugees.org/gcr-action/countries/germany>



## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

*resourcing state for more long-term outcomes.* Firms helped contribute human resources, office spaces, information technology and other technical infrastructure; in short, financial and material assistance (**Source: I1A/B**).

Further integration needs go far beyond the provision of safe, accessible and affordable housing. Successful integration demands effective language acquisition, acceptance of qualifications and rapid workforce training, access to jobs, the possibility to access childcare facilities and sustainable social and cultural plug-in. Eventually, access to German citizenship should become possible. Crucially, integration is a multi-process outcome – all processes relate to each other and are somewhat correlated (**Source: I1A/B**). A vivid example of this is the provision of a language course directly next door to a childcare facility in Berlin (**Source: I1A/B**).

Despite the best efforts to smooth problems and frictions, *actual and potential tension* between different refugee groups occur because of largely differentiated treatment between UARs and other refugee groups. The same is true with some problems involving competition between housing and resources for UARs and members of the host populations.

What will *future demand* look like? Obviously, no one knows, but the sustained return of refugees to their home country in the short term is very unlikely. In fact, one can expect another period of large-scale arrivals during the winter of 2022/23 across Europe (**Source: WS 1**). The movements between the main receiving countries (e.g., Poland, Germany) and main transit countries (e.g., Hungary, Slovakia, Romania) are uncertain, but the likelihood of substantial secondary movements is quite high. A revised European-wide distribution agenda that would impact refugee numbers and locations, as well as settlement and integration processes, may also affect anticipated outcomes.

### 2.3 Solutions to provide immediate and longer-term help for refugees

#### 2.3.1 Immediate programs to provide accommodation and housing for refugees

Short-term accommodation solutions for UARs have been guided by the explicit political goal of offering ‘decentralised/dispersed solutions’ and emphasis on rapid integration. The outcomes are estimated to be around 80% dispersedly and privately housed UARs, refugees concentrated in urban centres, a key role for intermediaries/connectors, and particular recognition of housing needs/integration bundles.

Solutions for accommodating UARs are mainly in the hands of five stakeholder groups. First, municipalities and communities – and their social agencies – coordinate reception and immediate accommodation. Second, private gatekeepers, mediators and translators lubricate settlement coordination. Third, private households are the main agents of housing refugees but also - like firms - donate money and provide in-kind support. Fourth, collective accommodation centres are self-organised entities that provide single rooms or multi-room living spaces for UARs. Fifth, in more extreme cases, emergency centres such as sports halls or container centres have to be used to deal with urgent demand.

Financial resources, especially for more structural solutions, come from the state. On a short-term basis, the Federal States and municipalities/communities provide the most extensive support; in the long term, it is the Federal Government/Administration and the Federal States. Private residents get some financial support for providing housing for refugees. This accommodation subsidy has differed across municipalities and communities and has taken into account local rent levels. Hotel



## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

accommodation has been subsidised per day and per person. After the ‘Legal Circle Change’ accommodation costs have been determined by the Cost of Accommodation (‘Kosten der Unterkunft’) rules of the Jobcenters. Private and philanthropic resources play an important role in ad-hoc support and crisis relief. Many refugees use their own funds.

Generally, all UAR groups are served well in a climate of a strong welcome culture and state and civil society support. However, tensions do occur for those who need to move out of temporary private accommodation, for later arrivals if they have greater support needs, fewer contacts and fewer resources, while solidarity-based responses are weakening. Big families suffer from the lack of larger flats. In addition, households with disabled people find it harder to circumvent barriers.

Coordination and management occur at different layers of the national state (Federal Government/Administration, Federal States, municipalities/communities) but also on a higher level with EU institutions and direct, bilateral member-state exchange. A second institutional sphere is the civil society where both individuals and institutions (established and new ones) contribute to good coordination outcomes. A third grouping is partnerships and initiatives that connect several stakeholders across different domains. Alliance4Ukraine,<sup>42</sup> for example, brings together hundreds of stakeholders across society in activity fields ranging from information/orientation, translation and legal advice to elementary provision such as for food, housing, healthcare and labour market-related assistance. Finally, platforms – often digitally mediated and already tested during the COVID-19 crisis – are being used to organise distribution and allocate resources efficiently. These instruments work particularly well if applied to data and information exchange and management, for example, concerning short-term UAR accommodation mapping in larger cities.

The initial institutional model of UAR accommodation has been based on ad hoc responses. As in Berlin, many civil society organisations (480 entities just in Berlin) can be grouped under the Alliance4Ukraine (A4U) model that links civil society groupings with the local and regional state. Good practices and successful city case studies (Nuremberg, Leipzig) are being analysed to help create positive integration arrangements ready before winter. Interestingly, A4U could build on previous expertise developed during the 2015 refugee crisis and streamlined under COVID-19 conditions (**Source: 1B**). Another initiative is ‘Erfurt Hilft’: an intra-state form of help and compilation of guidance in the fields of information and databases (**Source: 13B**). More generally, processes had to be identified and created as Article 24 § (1) of the Immigration Act (Temporary Protection) was activated for the first time. Everyone understands and interprets rules differently, so the search for more coherent practical approaches across boundaries is very important.

The establishment of individual accommodation contracts can be seen as a local institutional innovation. After the ‘Legal Circle Change’ in Germany, a ‘private accommodation permit’ was created as another legal option for housing UARs. Within the financial limits of state support, refugees can now search for housing and sign contracts. This initiative is supported via information and assistance from municipalities and communities (**Source: M7**).

Another noteworthy example of a financial incentive is the one offered by the Federal State of Baden-Württemberg. This scheme (1 million EUR/year) was established in 2021 and involves one-off payments of up to 2,000 EUR offered to owners of housing who rent out empty flats to refugees.

---

<sup>42</sup> <https://alliance4ukraine.org/>





## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

Because of the success – in 14 months, 60 flats could be returned to the rental market – the programme was renewed in October 2022 (**Source: M4, Source: M29**).

### 2.3.2 Longer-term, more permanent solutions to provide accommodation and housing for refugees

The search for long-term housing solutions to the Ukrainian Refugee Crisis is still in the early stages. It is, therefore, relatively early to try to identify emerging long-term responses.

While immediate responses have been provided by various stakeholders, in Germany, there seems to be an organisational move towards established social and charitable associations (e.g., Paritätische, Caritas, Diakonie, Johanniter, German Red Cross) as well as multiple agencies of the state. Nevertheless, A4U intends to continue work for at least another three years (**Source: 1B**) so that more institutional responses are framed by the ‘spirit of the crisis response period’. The current moment, the end of 2022, is characterised by a desire to move towards more systemic housing and integration solutions for UARs. There seems to be a shift underway from a ‘whole-of-society’-solidarity response prevalent in the first half year of the crisis, with ad-hoc measures based on welcoming refugees and working in partnerships, towards more structurally embedded and permanent housing and integration solutions for UA refugees.

More structural local accommodation and integration solutions mainly concern the effective working of municipal institutional systems. One example comes from Erfurt: four state agencies, the Municipal Department for Social Affairs (*accommodation and integration*), the Municipal Department for Youth Affairs (*Kindergarten and early childhood education*), the Jobcenter (*job and training*) and the Municipal Education Department (*schooling*) have worked together to create the *Erfurter Willkommensagentur (EWA)*. This intra-state organisation bundles social affairs, registration, and foreign affairs work and applies to all refugees, not just those from Ukraine. Interestingly, the idea came from the Social Affairs Department, the Mayor of Erfurt endorsed it, and the Federal State offered technical equipment.

Financial support is also available for local initiatives to develop accommodation capacities: for example, subsidised loans for municipalities. In the context of this scheme, the German Development Bank (KfW) has launched a special programme backed by over 250 million EUR (later increased to 500 million EUR because of rapid programme take-up - 46 applications for over 235 Mill EUR in only several days - to support German municipalities that are hosting refugees. The special programme ‘Refugee Centres’ offers an interest rate deduction of 0.75 % on up to 25 million EUR for each municipality and community for investment into collective centres. This instrument was previously used for Syrian refugees in 2015 <sup>43</sup>(**Source: M14**).

## 2.4 Availability of further services ensuring integration

In general terms, we are now witnessing a shift from a self-organised, grass-roots humanitarian assistance/crisis response based on solidarity to more systemic housing-led solutions for UA refugees (**Source: WS1**). Accordingly, humanitarian interventions, basic social security access, language and cultural orientation, labour market and training access, childcare and schooling, as well as social and

---

<sup>43</sup> KfW-Bank, 2022: KfW stockt Hilfsprogramm für Kommunen zur Unterbringung von Geflüchteten auf 500 Mio. EUR auf, available under <https://www.presseportal.de/pm/41193/5178160>





## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

cultural integration, are on the agenda. Key German reports thus speak of the importance of strengthening the integration potential of rural areas (**Source: R1**) and creating a discursive frame that can handle the long-term integration of refugees from a local perspective (**Source: R7**).

### 2.4.1 Basic social security and income-tested housing cost support

Basic social security support is available to UARs in the form of three mechanisms:

- (1) Unemployment Support ('Arbeitslosengeld II', 'Hartz IV'),
- (2) Social Support ('Sozialhilfe'),
- (3) Refugee/Asylum Support ('Leistungen nach dem Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz' (AsylbLG))

All these services include the so-called 'Cost for accommodation' scheme as part of the means-tested security benefit ('Kosten der Unterkunft und Heizung'/KdU) (see details in Section 1.2.2).

Moreover, to access subsidised 'social housing' a *Social Housing Permit* is necessary. This document says that the household only has a limited income. Under particularly challenging circumstances, an *Urgent Social Housing Permit* can be provided; a means of allowing privileged access to social housing.

### 2.4.2 Access to further health services and social support schemes

The basic security of refugees is ensured through access to health services and further basic services such as Child Support ('Kindergeld') and Study support ('BAföG'). It is noteworthy that UARs – like the host population - have full access to the general, publicly provided German health system. UARs who work in Germany or have been in the country for more than 15 months have access to Child Support. From 1 June 2022, access to study support (BAföG) has been organised.

Another important humanitarian intervention has been support for family reunification. This also entails the possibility of fathers joining their families after the war's end.

### 2.4.3 Language acquisition and cultural orientation

In order to make the integration process smoother in Germany, language courses and cultural orientation resources have been made available. For collective accommodation, it is requested that *binding and countrywide minimum standards* are adhered to. This rule refers to the design and equipping of spaces for language courses and childcare (**Source: R5**).

Very few Ukrainian refugees knew German well at the time of the survey (4%), but half of all respondents were already attending German language courses. The longer refugees are here, the greater the likelihood of attending a German language course (**Source: R16**).

### 2.4.4 Access to the labour market and training

Because of the high educational qualifications of UARs, especially higher education-trained refugees, labour market integration seems to be particularly beneficial for Germany (**Source IS4**). Nevertheless, refugees are often mothers with care responsibilities for children, thus, the integration of children in early childcare facilities, kindergartens, and schools (**Source: R12**) is needed for them to enter the labour market – see next section. This type of integration therefore relies on both the availability and



## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

accessibility of early childcare facilities across the country. A further constraint is the lack of language acquisition and firms' investment in jobs for refugees.

Seventeen percent of working-age Ukrainian refugees were employed at the time of the survey, and 71% of the employed refugees had a job requiring a vocational or university degree. Eighty-three percent of working UARs work as employees mainly engaging in intellectual activities, 8% as workers, and 8% as self-employed. Eighty-eight percent of the working UAR population are employed in the service sector (**Source: R16**).

### 2.4.5 *Childcare and schooling*

Of the children of refugees who live in Germany, 22% of under 3-year-old children and 59 % of 3–6-year-old children are in institutional childcare. For those parents who work or participate in a language or integration course, significantly greater childcare participation is noted (**Source: R16**). The Federal Ministry for Family, Seniors, Women and Youth prepares and supports bridge-building between UAR-households and childcare facilities through the program “*Kita-Einstieg: Brücken bauen in frühe Bildung*” [Childcare access: Bridge building into early education] (**Source: R8**).

Concerning schooling, of the 91% of UA families with school-age children, at least one child is participating in schooling. Almost one-third attend so-called ‘welcome classes’ (special classes just for Ukrainian children). Nearly one-quarter of families with school-age children use online education at a Ukrainian school (**Source: R16**).

The arrival of UARs has increased the number of children attending German schools by an average of 1.45%. However, the distribution is unequal, with some Federal States (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern; Saxony) having experienced double the increase due to UARs than Nordrhein-Westfalia (**Source: R11**). The acute shortage of teachers constitutes the most significant hurdle to education-mediated integration (**Source: R11**). These survey findings have been confirmed by local state leaders in Erfurt, who speak of very high pressure on the school system and the necessity of expanding classes for each year group (**Source: I2**).

### 2.4.6 *Social and cultural integration*

Social and cultural integration makes use of both the UA diaspora in Germany and relations with German host communities. The role of the diaspora matters early in the arrival process (**Source: I1A**) as well as throughout the settlement and integration process (**Source: I3A**). In fact, there exists excellent intra-UA connectivity and cooperation via physical and digital means (**Source: I2**).

Half of the UARs spend time with other UARS (not family) on several days of the week; 10 % do not. The figures for younger and older people are higher (**Source: R16**). Forty-four percent of UARs often spend time with Germans; 15% do not. UAR-German contact is facilitated by being in employment, attending school, and living in private accommodation (**Source: R16**). However, the need for support is increasingly tiring the host population who occasionally tend to blame others – including UARS - for higher energy prices and inflation (**Source: I2**).

### 3 Evaluation of the 'gap' between the needs of refugees and the offered housing solutions complemented with social services

This chapter of the German Case Study summarises the key *gaps, mismatches, and tensions* detected between Ukrainian long-term refugee needs and the combined housing-integration solutions and prospects currently on offer or being discussed in the country.

#### 3.1 Locational problems and mismatches

Locational problems are central to long-term housing solutions for Ukrainian Refugees in Germany. According to Empirica (**Source: R14**), there is adequate capacity to solve the refugee housing crisis largely by utilising unused housing stock around the country (including making space fit for use). However, in reality, housing stock availability (in East Germany and rural parts of the West) and self-actualized preferences for refugee settlement diverge strongly. The *rural–urban divergence*, despite German federalism and political devolution as well as relatively good infrastructure provision overall, constitutes a major gap.


This juxtaposition between economically vibrant vs economically struggling regions shows, in particular, in the availability of services and transportation. Where there is housing, there is a lack of services such as employment, transport, childcare, plug-in community and more comprehensive integration services. Where such services are available – mostly in cities and attractive regions – adequate and affordable housing is scarce. Under neoliberalising and globalising conditions, there has been a strong developmental pull towards cities in Germany, especially bigger ones, as well as attractive smaller places and university towns. Cities and municipalities today are thus key sites for Ukrainian refugee accommodation and integration. The distinct UAR profile further supports city-based integration pathways. This *housing–services mismatch* constitutes a serious policy challenge for Germany in terms of creating good UAR settlement and integration outcomes.

Under current conditions, only better-resourced and well-connected UA households can integrate easily in rural and less attractive areas. Solving the urban–rural challenge is, therefore, clearly central to solving the Ukrainian housing crisis. As spatial polarisation has become a hallmark of our times, the prime underlying question is whether refugee settlement outcomes will reinforce spatial inequality or actually help to tackle it.

For understanding the challenges behind utilising non-urban housing space for refugees, rural Thuringia is a good example. There are potentially 5,000 apartments available there, but the housing stock has to be improved to meet the nationwide social assistance criteria in terms of specific standards, equipment, and affordability. So, the *use-readiness of non-urban housing stock* (re-designation, infrastructure provision, and finally, furnishings) can be considered a key gap in housing provision. In addition, it is very hard to get craftspeople to alter existing housing because of supply chain problems and general demographic shortages. Further, there is always the that only a relatively small number of UAR households will remain in Germany after the cessation of hostilities in Ukraine, and the apartments will be empty again (**Source: I2**).

The maps below (Figures 12 and 13) illustrate the gap between the *expected settlement of UARs* (assumption: 25% free choice based on previous plug-in connections, 75% state-mediated distribution) and the *currently available housing stock*. It shows that bigger cities such as Berlin, Munich and

Hamburg, as well as North Rhine-Westphalia, Baden-Württemberg and Southern Bavaria are likely to receive excess UARs despite severe housing shortages, while parts of East Germany (Saxony, Thuringia, northern parts) will remain under-targeted. The idealistic assumption of 75% assigned distribution in this scenario appears far too high - more than six months after the study was published. This means mismatches could be even more substantial, despite some off-setting secondary migration flows.



### 3.2 Legislation system

Fieldwork revealed the general picture of where the first full use of Article 24 § (1) (*Aufenthaltsgewährung zum vorübergehenden Schutz*) of the Immigration Act – stipulating that residence permits could be issued to foreigners recognised as having temporary protection status based on the Council of the European Union’s Directive 2001/55/EC – has triggered a lot of inter-departmental innovation and cooperation within the German state. Different governmental entities – especially on the levels of the Federal States and the municipalities and communities – have been engaging in shared interpretation, pathfinding, and coordination to respond adequately to this new legal situation. Constantly, *gaps in legal interpretation* have had to be acknowledged and tackled in a joined-up and cooperative fashion. Overall, state actors - supported by civil society organisations and networks - did well in this respect. They also built on the rich and partly painful experiences of the 2015/2016 refugee influx as well as on COVID-19-related new digital engagement patterns.

Much larger gaps are opening up surrounding the consequences of the *differentiated treatment* of those people coming to Germany under the above-mentioned *Paragraph 24 / Immigration Act*

<sup>44</sup> Source: R14 (Empirica, 2022)



## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

compared to those who enter the country under *Paragraph 16 / German constitution* as asylum seekers. Differences, notably, include access to the housing and labour markets.

Currently, only guest apartments and empty apartments can be considered for temporary acquisition, whereas otherwise under-used private property is excluded (**Source: M28**). Another gap concerns the possibility of redefining the legal foundations for the common-good-oriented *Limited Profit Housing Sector* that was abolished in the 1980s and is thus currently prohibited by law. However, according to the recent German *Housing Partnership* ('*Bündnis für Wohnen*'), the Federal Government wants to re-create this sector in the coming years.

### 3.3 Financial framework

There is severe financial pressure now from municipalities and communities as compensation payments from the Federal States for accommodated or settled refugees are not sufficient or delayed. Payments for refugees to local governments are often organised up-front and are the latter are thus in urgent need of reimbursement. In short, *federal finance flows between Federal States and municipalities and communities* are contentious and lagging at times.

There have also been delays concerning *compensatory payments to private landlords* who offer refugee accommodation for free. These payments and the modalities surrounding them differ from Federal State to Federal State and from locality to locality. Besides administrative gaps, no accurate database provides an overview of where Ukrainian refugees are currently housed.

There is an *investment gap associated with the critical infrastructure for integration, i.e., schooling*. The gap, estimated at 45 billion euros, is of great concern. municipalities and communities struggle, particularly with significantly rising energy and material costs. Consequently, they will not be able to offer crucial integration infrastructure in adequate form.

*Price increases in the service and construction sector* are further exacerbating the housing shortage as no actors will be able to take up loans and/or invest in new housing provision, even if state co-funding schemes are available.

### 3.4 Main housing regime framework and feasibility of long-term solutions

Germany's main housing regime framework is currently being challenged in two significant ways, and the Ukrainian housing challenge amplifies these issues:

First, the current dynamic influx of UARs is exerting substantial additional pressure on the *urban subsidised housing* segment. Notably, Germany entered the 2020s with substantial social housing underinvestment that had accumulated over many years. The current national subsidised housing deal is problematic as substantial subsidies only result in a relatively small share of proper social housing (**Source: A1**). Municipal housing is mostly cross-subsidised and often requires profits to be paid back to municipalities and communities. What is needed is an expansion of the long-term housing that is being offered according to the principles of (retained) affordability, accessibility, security of tenure and decent quality.

Second, economically better-off households may contribute to the pre-existing *squeeze in the middle* in-between homeownership arrangements (now often out of reach for many because of excessive deposit size requirements and rising interest rates) and scarce, means-tested subsidised housing. This





## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

middle-income gap leaves little alternative to private rental tenure solutions and thus magnifies challenges in this otherwise - so far - very successful segment of the German housing system. This segment has for years faced sustained pressure related to affordability due to rising rents and security-of-tenure problems as a result of modernisation and tenure conversion projects in high-pressure urban markets such as Berlin.

### 3.5 Inadequacy of the physical composition of the housing stock

On the apartment level, the affordable German housing stock is usually quite limited. In many cities, too many small apartments exist for middle- and lower-income groups. A recent study concluded that on the basis of the additional demand from UARs – with relatively positive expected labour market outcomes, high labour force participation for women, and a high degree of children and families – what is needed are bigger apartments that are suitable for families and of a moderate standard of quality (Source: R14). New construction is particularly important here, but not speedy delivery associated with poor standards in inaccessible locations.

At the same time, age and disability-related requirements cause major challenges for new investment and modernisation. The large share of disabled people amongst the UARs combined with unmet demand in the host population combines to create sustained pressure on adequate housing stock adaptation in terms of both quantity and quality. However, higher interest rates, steep material and labour cost increases, and international supply chain disruptions are causing delays in new investment. However, Empirica (Source: R14) calculate that half of the apartments needed for UARs in Germany will come from filling up empty stock and half from constructing new buildings.

The German Government wants to build 400,000 new apartments per year. The recently created 'Partnership for Housing' has agreed with this goal. Empirica (Source: R14) expects 1.3 million refugees and an added demand of 500,000 additional apartments. However, implementation will be very difficult, and prolonged plans may undermine trust. Diverse investment objectives are strongly contested by pressure due to presently outstanding demand, affordability, green/decarbonisation requirements, the energy transition and ongoing regulatory hurdles and bureaucracy.

### 3.6 Cultural adequacy requirements

Cultural adequacy is an important marker of the successful housing-mediated integration of refugees. In terms of the current refugees from Ukraine, it can be said that there is, overall, a very good cultural match between the refugees and the hosts in Germany. This observation of cultural affinity and shared values is much more pronounced than during the last big immigration influx by largely Syrian refugees in 2015/2016. In addition, the dominant refugee household profile of mothers with younger children reinforces a certain caring and supportive attitude. In other words, the opportunity for positive integration outcomes should be rather good from a cultural perspective.

However, not all current refugees from Ukraine are Ukrainian citizens. For example, the cultural treatment of third-country refugees from Africa and Asia has been quite different from that of Ukrainian citizens. In Berlin, for instance, third-country refugees (Source: IS2) from Nigeria were much harder to distribute to accommodation after arrival (Source IS4). There were clearly 'welcome differences'. Given the different legal treatment in collective accommodation, tension between Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian refugees might increase. The issue of limited cultural recognition and the role of racism has also been detected across Eastern Europe (Source: WS 1). If the 'welcome culture'



## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

diminishes in strength during the coming months, competition and conflict between refugees and hosts and refugees might become stronger.

A local administrative leader provided an everyday example of culturally based tensions in a residential setting (**Source: I3**). It was highlighted that in relation to the residential practices of rubbish and waste collection/separation, clear differences in expectations had led to cultural friction. Also, noise rules were sometimes not respected, and certain animal-related practices were considered culturally unacceptable. Further structural constraints include the language deficit that hinders communication and shared problem-solving. Residential settings illuminate a number of cultural gaps and, if untreated, may reinforce stigmatisation and socio-spatial segregation.

An interesting and potentially relevant cultural gap has emerged concerning Ukrainian's *expectations about living in rural areas*. Because standards and available services are of much lower quality in the countryside in Ukraine – often, for example, lacking running water or paved streets – the same has been expected in and about the German rural areas. This expectation mismatch obviously adds to acceptance-related problems connected with non-urban UAR settlement and puts additional pressure on urban settlement (**Source: I1A**).

Issues of cultural adequacy, related ethnic discrimination, as well as associated competition for resources underscore the relevance of the question whether ongoing constituency support will remain available for building and implementing new solutions to the Ukrainian housing crisis or whether public support will diminish!

### 3.7 Lack of needed social assistance and other services

The lack of social assistance is a much more minor issue in Germany than in neighbouring and receiving countries. In fact, the relative financial generosity of Germany often induces refugees to want to come to Germany in the first place. Moreover, UARs receive the same social assistance treatment as the host population. However, *inflation* may severely impact the real value of subsidies.

The UARs - especially the early arrivals - possess exceptionally good social capital (diaspora network, digital affinity) and partly related solid cultural capital for navigating settlement and integration pathways. Later UAR arrivals, however, are less likely to possess the resources needed to integrate and may exhibit more and multiple vulnerabilities and need to rely much more on the German State for housing and associated services. They may face much a greater likelihood of living in collective accommodation and being subject to administration-led distribution.

UARs who may not be able to stay in attractive urban centres and well-functioning regions may be exposed to *deprivation and stigma, including in spatial terms*, contributing to a growing UAR-fueled underclass in German cities. The rather *complex integration needs of UARs* (especially women, children, and people with disabilities, pets, people with trauma), may not easily be reconciled with adequate housing and integration opportunities in Germany after all.

### 3.8 Information gaps related to effective decision-making

Concerning general decision-making regarding Germany's housing system in relation to UAR settlement, a number of gaps are opening up right now:





## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

### 3.8.1 *Social and housing data gaps*

While lacking private rental sector (PRS) information is currently not really an issue in Germany, unlike in some other New Member States such as Poland (recent informal discussions of the author in Warsaw) and Hungary, challenges may emerge in this respect in future. The massive arrival of UARs leads to largely decentralised/dispersed and private accommodation patterns. We can also expect considerable but unaccounted 'back-and-forth' migration. Inconsistent counting and measures by the Federal Government/Administration cause data gaps and data 'islands'. In addition, the general sensitivities towards data protection and the lack of digitalisation in Germany pose structural data generation and utilisation challenges. Finally, platform arrangements implemented to measure and monitor relevant housing and integration dynamics are vastly improving but are still inconsistent and incoherent across space and institutions (see also **Source: IS3**).

### 3.8.2 *Forecast data gaps for risk mitigation*

Current pendulum migration dynamics are largely unknown, and future demand for refugee housing - for both UARs and other refugees - is extremely uncertain. Moreover, the extent of the current economic downturn, the implications of further interest rate rises, the possibility of an actual near construction freeze, and the impact of the mounting cost-of-living pressures for many – all these factors trigger remarkable uncertainty on the supply side (**Source: M23**).

For each stakeholder group, there are tangible risks that need to be mitigated. Targeted questions can be asked. For *private investors*: how can profits continually be extracted via housing? For *non-profit actors*: how can cost-rental models be sustainable in current times? For *state administrators*: how can public finance pay for much-needed new housing investment in the name of the common good? For *politicians*, what are the best housing regime decisions for all citizens and the UARs? And, how can housing-related decisions be communicated without risking political capital? And for *people*: how can housing outcomes be achieved that make sure everyone has a roof over their head, and well-being, social harmony, and productive goals are advanced? The wider implications for housing system-related decision-making are far from trivial and may challenge our assumptions, expectations, and practices!



## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe

commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

**Table 2. Gaps/ Mismatches/ Tensions between Ukrainian Refugee Needs and offered Housing Solutions in Germany (Gap Summary)**

#	Specific Nature of Gap/Mismatch/Tension	Gaps/ Mismatches/ Tensions 1	Gaps/ Mismatches/ Tensions 2	Gap/ Mismatches/ Tensions 3
1	<b>Locational problems and mismatches</b>	Housing – services mismatch because of structural rural-urban divergence	Use-readiness of non-urban housing stock	Gap/mismatch expected spatial UAR-settlement vs. Available housing stock
2	<b>Legislative system</b>	Ongoing gaps in legal interpretation of § 24 between state entities	Differentiated treatment of people under § 24 (Immigration Act) vs. § 16 (Constitution)	<i>Maybe</i> : temporary acquisition of private property, legal set-up of Limited Profit Housing Sector
3	<b>Financial framework</b>	Federal finance flows between Federal States and local municipalities and communities, Compensatory payments to private UAR-landlords	Availability and maintenance of accurate database information on the decentral accommodation situation	Prevailing infrastructure investment gaps relevant to housing-led integration, Swiftly rising financing costs of any housing/infrastructure construction
4	<b>Main housing regime framework and feasibility of long-term solutions</b>	Substantial pressure on the urban subsidised housing segment, Acceleration of pre-existing ‘squeeze-in-the-middle’-tenure problems	Federal States and Local municipalities/communities are reaching capacity limits for refugee accommodation	Several structural gaps in potential housing-led integration pathways
5	<b>Inadequacy of the physical composition of the housing stock</b>	Housing stock adequacy gap	Construction Feasibility/Priority gap	Aspirations – Implementation gap
6	<b>Cultural adequacy requirements</b>	Overall, still minor mismatches	Cultural treatment of third-country refugees	Very negative expectations concerning living in rural areas
7	<b>Lack of needed social assistance and other services</b>	Inflation and housing affordability gap	More vulnerable late UAR arrivals	<i>Maybe</i> : Risk of deprivation and stigma - rich hotspot living, Challenging sophisticated integration bundle of UARs
8	<b>Information gaps for effective decision-making</b>	Problem-solution data gaps	Problem-solution foresight gaps	Risk management gaps

Source: Author

## 4 Main lessons and recommendations

### 4.1 General lessons

(1) UARs responses are best organised via *decentral/dispersed and private accommodation*, strongly accompanied by adequate support services (**Source: R2/R6**). The advantages of dispersed housing lie in more sizable living space, more suitable and acceptable settings for residential living, a more attractive urban lifestyle, and fewer noise disruptions. Stakeholders favour a spatial refugee distribution management characterised by careful decision-making and individual consideration, not top-down bureaucratic decisions. Trade-offs have to be considered carefully. Critical tension exists between cities that offer fewer housing options but solid plug-in services and networks and rural areas that often have available housing but are hard to get to and lack services. Thus, *distribution should be implemented according to broader local absorption capacity* (economic, jobs, public finance, demography, housing), the use of attractive incentives for smaller towns to compete for refugees, and a rural-based financial instrument for promoting subsidised housing (**Source: R5**). The state-organised Königsteiner Schlüssel distribution mechanism has been criticised on a number of points, including locating refugees in economically lagging regions, which impedes financial independence and progress. Therefore, it should be adjusted.

(2) There is a strong call to create *more affordable housing for all*. In high-pressure urban housing markets, social housing construction and new rentals should be combined with the conversion of non-residential housing into residential housing (**Source: R5**). The Federal Government, in partnership with many housing system stakeholders, set itself the ambitious goal of producing 400,000 apartments per year, of which 100,000 are social housing units. Until 2026 14.5 billion EUR are earmarked for this aspirational goal (**Source: R10**). Beyond the central-level scheme, for example, Baden-Württemberg set up an attractive 80 million euro support scheme for 2022/2023, for which cities and towns can apply. The condition is that housing will be a) owned for twenty years by the municipality and, b) designated for refugees or social housing for the first ten years. This initiative is based on an even more extensive programme developed during the refugee crisis in 2015 (**Source: M4**). Another example comes from Nordrhein-Westfalen. The NRW-Bank (Nordrhein-Westfalen-Bank) offers attractive loans to private actors, and municipalities and communities if housing is used for refugees for five years (**Source: 1B**). New construction is thought to be governed by innovative and digital planning as well as accelerated construction (**Source: R10**). This could be supported by *circular and sustainable construction methods and building materials* which can enhance cost savings and through modular/serial-built environment options based on *nationwide and consistent standardisation*. *Mobilisation of vacant housing* could be facilitated with incentives for local populations to downsize from larger to smaller apartments. One instrument for promoting this shift could be the cost reimbursement of moving and renovation by the state (**Source: R5**).

(3) *Rural areas* in Germany have to be made ready to accommodate refugees through investing in *attractive, reliable and affordable mobility solutions*. At the same time, the shortage of land for construction in urban areas could be tackled by creating *strategic communal and regional land funds*.

(4) UARs will need access to all housing policy instruments to enter the diverse sub-markets of the German housing system. *Purchase of housing should be encouraged via dedicated support and saving*



## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe

commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

options, as well as cooperation with development banks and additional funding from federal levels (**Source: R5**).

(5) *Effective information and communication* with host populations can strengthen hospitality and create a welcoming mindset. Information systems can inform and guide refugee-related decisions in areas such as work, schooling, community, religion and leisure time.

## 4.2 Recommendations

### 4.2.1 Increase affordable housing supply

Approximately one million vacant flats could be used as accommodation for UARs and people from the host population (**Source: R14**). In addition, some second homes and holiday/guest apartments might be used for housing. Conversions and new constructions should add to the available, affordable housing pool. Environmental and social/human rights objectives must be carefully reconciled (**Source: IS8**). The UAR crisis has reinforced the need to incorporate demography and disability-related concerns into planning and construction (e.g. elevator access, wheelchair-aligned spaces and noise reduction). Urban planning and design and the whole value chain of construction, supported by reasonable and facilitative regulation, must be adjusted to cope with the new political-economic conditions.

#### **Tools for increasing the affordable housing supply are as follows:**

##### **(1) Mobilise and upgrade unused and under-utilised housing**

In Germany, spatial economic unevenness means that the empty housing stock (approximately one million apartments) is available, especially in the Eastern parts of the country and some rural areas of the West. However, incorporating these spaces into the private rental sector (PRS) and municipal housing will require careful risk management concerning UAR demand fluctuation. This risk could be underwritten by a public insurance fund that would compensate private and communal landlords if this risk eventuates.

The other challenge is to make empty housing stock ready for use in the first place. This task usually entails infrastructure, renovation, and furnishing work. In this regard, a combination of targeted financial support (e.g. KfW-Bank/Federal State-owned banks) and partnership arrangements across local state/potential landlord/non-profit-volunteers could be implemented. It might be worthwhile advocating for a substantial rural and town-directed investment and service investment package that includes the activation of new housing stock.

##### **(2) Activate second homes and guest homes for temporary use**

An additional intervention could focus on guest/holiday homes and second homes around the country. These spaces could be made temporarily useable until longer-term solutions have been created. Legally, guest/holiday homes do not count as rental places and are not covered by residential rental law. These spaces could be used for accommodating UARs for a certain amount of time. This approach could be incentivised by compensation payments that would have to be organised via the sub-national state administration. Alternatively, Germany could also follow the example of the UK and actively urge second homeowners to take in Ukrainian refugees voluntarily (**Source: M22**).



## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

### **(3) Re-function and convert existing urban building stock for residential use**

Notably, in cities, there may be a chance to convert commercial building stock into residential housing. Some inner-city locations witnessed particularly reduced demand for office space during the COVID-19 crisis, while inner-city residential spaces are increasingly scarce. Commercial property can be converted into residential property if zoning and housing laws allow it. In other words, Federal States and the Federal Administration should legally and financially enable conversions by supporting service chains.

### **(4) Facilitate residential downsizing for better matching household–home relations**

Incentivising downsizing residential living for households that live in homes that are too big for them can create additional living space, e.g., through state-sponsored reimbursement for moving and/or renovation costs (*Source: R5*).

### **(5) Accelerate affordable housing construction**

Frameworks for the finance, planning, building and operation of residential housing stock have to be adjusted to the new situation. Promoting modular, serial and digitally enabled construction methods can add to productivity growth (*Source: IS7, Source: M24*). The current pressures are clearly forcing the government and other actors to trial new ways of building much-needed residential housing. Successful scaling and rolling out of solutions will considerably depend much on effective and consistent nationwide standardisation of materials, processes, and standards.

Adapting and increasing the financial support system for housing construction is one key requirement for positively changing this situation. Whereas new policies on tax incentives promise some improvement, private builders and real estate representatives advocate for not just additional one-off payments for interest depreciation. They are also very concerned that efficiency standards (supported by governmental subsidies) are too high for private actors to achieve (*Source: M25*).

### **(6) Foster affordable, inclusive, sustainable and productive municipal housing systems development**

Municipal housing systems geared to respond to the vexing challenges of housing demand, affordability, inclusion, productivity, and environmental sustainability goals need substantial municipal autonomy and steering capacity. National and sub-national leadership is pivotal for the existence of a viable financial base. This economic foundation may allow new tax arrangements to be set up that skew housing-mediated wealth benefits towards housing ‘losers’ (see Vienna, also Singapore).

#### **Key stakeholders/responsibilities:**

- Advocacy coalitions
- Commercial and development banks
- Construction industry
- European incentives
- State on all levels (Federal Government/Administration, Federal States, municipalities/communities)
- Planning authorities
- Private actors
- The role of CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)/ESG (Environment, Social, Governance Reporting))



## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe

commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

### **UARs accommodation and integration benefits:**

- Mobilised residential housing space likely to be more affordable than newly built stock
- Empty stock in the east may mean easier integration potential than for Syrians in 2015/2016
- Downsizing strategies may produce larger apartments for an affordable rent for UARs (family needs, further household expansion possible)
- Higher quality standards possible for UAR housing
- More customised housing in accordance with refugee profile (children, disabled, pets)
- New construction in areas of high UAR demand possible (diaspora, services, employment)

### **Main barriers to intervention:**

- Available housing stock is usually located in less attractive non-metropolitan and rural areas in the east, but also the west
- These already mentioned areas may exhibit more anti-refugee sentiment
- Raising the use-readiness of unused housing stock (Source: I2) in rural areas is costly, operationally challenging, and risky from an investment perspective
- Legal and operational challenges associated with second-home use
- In cities, conversions from office to residential are initially logistically challenging
- Incentivisation barriers to home downsizing (often soft approaches)
- Rise in construction costs (materials, human resources)
- Increase in financing costs
- Too few non-profit housing actors and subsidised housing stock

#### *4.2.2 Create strategic urban housing responses*

Urban housing demand pressure must be tackled to address the mismatch of the expected spatially specific UAR settlement and available housing stock. Housing strategies for these spaces have to ensure the parallel pursuit of economic viability, affordability, liveability and urban design, and environmental sustainability.

### **Tools for systematic urban housing responses are as follows:**

#### **(1) Redesign urban land management**

As land prices are key to understanding the trajectory of urban house price rises (**Source: A4**), effective urban land management will strongly determine affordable urban housing markets in the future. The current contraction of private building and investment activity, therefore, needs to be counterbalanced by enabling and incentivising municipalities to buy reduced-price urban built environment and land for affordable housing usage. This strategic component entails tackling questions of urban land acquisition for affordable housing use as well as building partnerships with major urban landowners in the name of affordable housing production, for example, on the basis of leasehold development.

#### **(2) Make use of the housing/integration potential of Germany's metropolitan systems**

Germany's twelve metropolitan systems – Berlin/Brandenburg, Hamburg, Bremen/Oldenburg, Hannover/Braunschweig/Göttingen/Wolfsburg, Leipzig and Mitteldeutschland, Metropole Ruhr, Rheinland, Frankfurt/Rhein-Main, Rhein-Neckar, Stuttgart, Nürnberg and München – are associated with one specific means of solving the UAR housing crisis. Because of their excellent public and private



## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe

commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

transport systems and infrastructure networks, these regions have become large-scale functional urban areas that enable people to work in the heart of the regions and live dispersed across the whole region. Metropolitan systems are thus well-suited to facilitate the access of UARs to labour markets and cultural plug-in while not being totally constrained by the very tight housing markets that the metropolitan centres exhibit.

### **(3) Plan and develop multi-purpose, mixed and affordable urban neighbourhoods**

District-centric infrastructure provision, neighbourhood-centric socioeconomic interactions and community-based socio-cultural mixing promise better integration outcomes. Germany's unique '*Städtebauförderung*' (urban development tool; part of its spatial development framework) has proven its worth as an excellent tool for facilitating adequate investment and coordination; thus, scaling up of city- and neighbourhood-specific housing responses should be integral to these initiatives.

#### **Key stakeholders/responsibilities:**

- Horizontal state coordination (metro-regions),
- Joint-up government (cross-departmental work)
- Municipalities
- Urban landowners
- Local urban partnerships
- Economic development and community development actors
- Role of corporate urban responsibility

#### **UARs accommodation and integration benefits:**

- Housing located where community, services and employment opportunities are
- Easier moving from decentralised urban accommodation and collective centres to new residences because of proximity and familiarity
- Tenure innovation may produce affordable urban futures for UARs
- Possibility for mixed neighbourhoods and mixed school communities with potentially positive social and cultural capital generation

#### **Main barriers to intervention:**

- Shortage of urban housing supply, affordability issues, risk of overcrowding and other housing deprivation
- Intense competition with host population over urban residential spaces
- Lack of empty spaces means more costly construction work

#### *4.2.3 Create responses in the rural context*

Increased spatial polarisation creates different conditions for housing solutions in the German countryside. On paper, there is much potential for successful housing-led integration of UARs because of the generally greater availability of housing stock. However, the challenges of activating this stock and making it ready for use are exacerbated by the difficulty of providing adequate services and infrastructure for successful integration. In addition to labour-market services and adequate childcare, affordable, reliable and regular access to public transport is needed.





## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

### **Tools for systematic rural housing responses are as follows:**

#### **(1) Engage in effective spatial refugee distribution management**

Available vacant housing is predominantly located in non-metropolitan and rural areas. These spaces are to be found in the east as well as the economically struggling and more remote regions in the west. The UAR target group for these parts of the country is likely to be more flexible, mobile, and better resourced than the average Ukrainian household. The current distribution scheme (Königsteiner Schlüssel: Spatial Distribution Key) needs to be adapted to organise distribution according to local absorption capacity (economic potential, jobs, public finance, demography). Moreover, there is a need to provide attractive incentives to encourage smaller towns to compete for refugees and a rural-based financial instrument for promoting subsidised housing (*Source: R5*).

#### **(2) Invest in expanding mobility options, services, infrastructure and housing**

Attractive rural areas in Germany – for both host populations as well as refugee and immigrant groups – need to offer attractive, reliable and affordable mobility for all. Peripheral regions will otherwise never be able to compete with burgeoning cities. Transport should ideally be integral to rural and town-directed investment and service investment packages, making rural housing a viable and rewarding development and settlement alternative. These transformations should ideally be accompanied by pan-national digital strategies that would make it easier to live and work in these areas. In fact, the countryside could become the catalyst for the much-needed acceleration of digital roll out and better service quality in Germany. Adequate infrastructure is the basis for adequate housing. Concerning the latter, a federal state-aligned strategy for non-urban housing strategies (readiness, infrastructure access, marketability, operation) is conceivable and should be promoted.

#### **(3) Use advocacy, information, communication and consultation to boost welcoming attitudes**

Inhabitants of non-metropolitan areas and smaller towns are often characterised by a more conservative mindset that may - under conditions of economic decline and decreasing liveability - be receptive to populist or revanchist political rhetoric. Refugees have been and would be among the first victims if these sentiments turn into open rejection or even hate. The terrible events of mobs turning against refugees in the early 1990s in Germany are an important reminder. Targeted information, communication and advocacy strategies could help to build more of an enduring welcome and integration culture in these areas. Pre-arrival public consultation should become routine practice. Furthermore, ongoing role model and public figure action that supports integration, assimilation and shared futures should be promoted and organised.

#### **Key stakeholders/responsibilities:**

- Communities and Federal States
- Cross-departmental state coordination
- Key infrastructure providers
- Key service providers
- Local rural partnerships

#### **UARs accommodation and integration benefits:**

- Housing quality indicators (size, cost, quality) likely to be better than in cities



## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe

commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

- Digital infrastructure and service progress coupled with UA digital affinity may produce win-win outcomes for hosts and refugees
- Positive experiences may fuel success stories about successful rural integration trajectories that may pave the way for cumulative future improvements

### **Main barriers to intervention:**

- Non-urban investment is risky concerning future demand stability
- Service and infrastructure mismatches pose integration challenges
- Ukrainian expectations about rural life can produce false impressions of utter backwardness and a lack of basic services
- Conservative values may turn into anti-integration attitudes

#### 4.2.4 *Adjust tenancy regulations*

The legal basis for long-term housing decisions should be anchored in the ‘housing tenure continuum’. As regional, national and sub-national housing systems deeply reflect history, culture, institutions and socio-economic circumstances, tenure structures, relations and actors’ conduct mirror these characteristics.

### **Tools for tenancy adjustment options are as follows:**

#### **(1) Strategically regulate and manage the private rental sector (PRS)**

The private rental sector will be key to solving the UAR housing crisis, especially at the beginning, until capacity in other housing market segments has been improved (**Source: M21**). The mobilisation of PRS spaces and further expansion should be accompanied by careful regulation and management. Communication and advocacy, monitoring and data provision, community liaison as well as conflict resolution should be part of this mitigating assistance infrastructure. The yardstick for assessing PRS solutions should be security of tenure, affordable living, and relative proximity to networks, employment, schooling, and broader services.

#### **(2) Expand the role and capacity of subsidised and non-profit-oriented housing sectors**

An absolutely central solution is expanding social housing as well as all forms of public, municipal, cooperatives and limited/non-profit tenures. The principles of state subsidy, non-profitability and mutuality will be of vital importance for housing solutions, especially in the medium- and long term. Current Federal Government intentions indicate this direction. In addition, communal forms of housing ownership and management must be explored.

#### **(3) Strategically adjust and reform the owner-occupied sector**

In order to make homeownership more affordable, besides expanding tax incentives, tenure innovation could focus on shared equity arrangements as well as on leasehold homeownership in bigger cities. The former *Inherited Lease Model* (*‘Erbpachtmodell’*) should be revisited. Cities such as Hamburg (**Source: M26**) are rediscovering it now under acute crisis conditions to help meet middle-class housing demand. Better-off UA households may constitute one emerging target group for this tenure type.



## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe

commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

### **(4) Strengthen the state's role and capacity**

State leadership is at the centre of any legal reform and intervention. The range of potential interventions spans new legal frameworks associated with shared good housing provision to urban land acquisition for affordable housing use to incentivising actors to behave in ways that are perceived as social and inclusive. Financial housing support programmes would feature strongly in these strategies.

#### **Key stakeholders/responsibilities:**

- Whole housing system actor landscape
- Joined-up government (cross-departmental work)
- Municipal housing actors
- Federal finance and housing ministries, tax department

#### **UARs' accommodation and integration benefits:**

- Tenure innovation may increase positive housing outcomes in terms of security
- Leasehold homeownership perhaps within reach of better-off UA households and the middle-class in general
- Revived social housing (either targeted via private actors or limited-profit actors) will benefit lower socioeconomic groups in both UAR- and host communities

#### **Main barriers to intervention:**

- Resistance due to vested interests and winners of previous tenure arrangements
- Conservative attitudes may result in shying away from more structural solutions (at least initially)
- Check-and-balance governance may impede necessary and more radical reforms
- Financial implications: redistribution, new debt
- Legal implications



## 5 Normative checklist for policy principles serving housing inclusion for UARs

Better housing and integration outcomes for Ukrainian refugees also need to address longer-term structural issues. Following the Leipzig Charter and other guiding policy frameworks, more systemic transformations should be governed by the *principles of the common good, productive renewal, social equity and environmental sustainability*.

Institutional, civic society and practice innovation form the basis for *partnerships* between state actors and businesses interests, civic society, advocacy organisations, experts and affected housing consumption groupings. The shared goal should be the transformation of housing systems, actor relations and organisational capacities that fosters support for the housing-led integration of refugees and migrants and improves housing outcomes for the local population.

The normative checklists below summarise the policy principles that support the sustainable and long-term housing inclusion of UARs while framing the policy context for a sustainable, affordable housing system.

### 5.1 Governance: legal frameworks, policy settings, effective incentives and state-level capacity

The following checklist may be used to confirm whether legal frameworks, policy settings, effective incentives and state-level capacity support the proposed policy tools.

- Is there alignment between refugee and host population policies?
- Do housing policies build on proactive supply and finance policies, accompanied by ongoing institutional innovation, are they common good-based solutions, and do they have a strict anti-financialisation component?
- Is spatial and functional policy consistency across UAR integration mechanisms and other associated policy interventions?
- Are the policy learnings of the 2015 refugee process included?
- Are there efforts to close 'data gaps' (extensive use of digital tools and platform-building in support of evidence-based decision framing and decision-building)?
- Are policy barriers and bottlenecks clearly addressed by resilient response strategies?
- Is there vertical state partnering from the EU-level to the neighbourhood level and horizontal partnering across adjacent local areas?
- Are clear coordination mechanisms in place to sustain cross-departmental cooperation that connects several policy domains?

### 5.2 Actors, business models and practices

The following checklist may be used to confirm whether effective institutions, actor groupings, relationships and good practices are in place to support the proposed strategies.

- Does institutional and sector innovation support 'trailing and experimenting'; that is, bottom-up practice innovation (e.g., via intermediaries such as Alliance 4 Ukraine)?



## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe

commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

- Is good practice transfer and scaling-up ensured, e.g., via national and international circuits / learning over time?
- Does partnership-building include close work with UA diaspora and UA community leaders?
- Is there strong state-civil society cooperation and partnering in the areas of coordination, intermediation and quality control/ risk mitigation?
- Are cross-sector partnership arrangements and voluntary/ civil society approaches part of the 'whole-of-society' response to the UA refugee crisis?
- Do the negotiation and conflict mitigation mechanisms associated with residential living incorporate UARs?
- Is more efficient collection and exchange of information ensured by database building and information and communication platforms?
- Is there strong pro-UAR-integration advocacy and communication that builds on a multi-channel communication framework, with strong and mobilizing messages regarding ongoing UAR support and integration?

### 5.3 Housing-led integration at the whole-of-society level


Severe demographic challenges (such as an ageing population) and economic constraints concerning inclusive growth, productivity and innovation call for the ongoing and sustained absorption of people from other countries into our society. Be this in the form of much-needed migrants, refugees or temporary workers - the provision of adequate housing and the establishment of effective and reliable services will always be at the heart of attracting and keeping people here in our country. The UAR situation, viewed from this perspective, could be understood as an important societal learning experiment with profound longitudinal economic and 'beyond-economy' implications (**Source: R9, Source: A6**).

Housing aspects and integration aspects could be combined to produce positive overall outcomes. Indeed, housing-led integration (Figure 14) could become the overall societal and governmental vision. Housing is a key individual and social domain for security, well-being and participation. Trade-offs must be considered carefully, and case-specific circumstances should guide decision-making as much as possible.

For confirming whether the cross-cutting nature and strong interdependencies associated with the respective issues are addressed and social activation support the housing-led integration of UARs, two core questions must be answered in the affirmative. Namely:

- Are interventions integrated into a relatively coherent set of intentions and actions that – in the long-term – have the potential to lead to positive housing-led outcomes?
- Are the improvements simultaneously expected to apply to many members of the German host society as well as refugee communities from Ukraine and elsewhere?

## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International



**Figure 14. Housing-led Ukrainian refugee integration model<sup>45</sup>**

<sup>45</sup> Source: Author



## 6 Bibliography

### 6.1 I / WS - Interviews and Workshops

**I1A** Mr Freddy Lange, Director/Alliance4Ukraine (1.part), 28/09/2022

**I1B** Mr Freddy Lange, Director/Alliance4Ukraine (2.part), 05/10/2022

**I2** Interview, Mirjam Kruppa, Beauftragte für Integration, Migration und Flüchtlinge; Thüringer Ministerium für Migration, Justiz und Verbraucherschutz (TMMJV), 29/09/2022 / 7/11/2022

**I3A** Social Agency, City of Erfurt, Department Leader, Mr Matthias-Benedikt Schareck, 10/10/2022

**I3B** Social Agency, City of Erfurt, Leader – Migration Policy, Ms Isabell Jonas-Röser, 10/10/2022

**WS1** Housing Europe, Webinar, 20/9/2022

### 6.2 R - Nationally specific Reports

**R1** Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung (BBSR) im Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung (BBR): *Integration von Flüchtlingen in den regulären Wohnungsmarkt*, BBSR-Online-Publikation Nr. 21/2017

**R2** Forschungszentrums Migration, Integration und Asyl des Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Authors: Andrea Baier, Manuel Siegert): *BAMF-Kurzanalyse: Die Wohnsituation Geflüchteter*, **February 2018** (German Edition)

**R3** Institute for Migration Studies and Intercultural Studies/ Bonn, International Center for Conversion (bicc) (Author: Isabella Bauer): *Unterbringung von Flüchtlingen in deutschen Kommunen: Konfliktmediation und lokale Beteiligung*, *Flucht: Forschung und Transfer*, State-of-Research Papier, 10, **Juli 2017**

**R4** PRO ASYL (Author: Kay Wendel): *Unterbringung von Flüchtlingen in Deutschland Regelungen und Praxis der Bundesländer im Vergleich*, **August 2014**

**R5** Robert Bosch Stiftung/Expertenkommission zur Neuausrichtung der Flüchtlingspolitik, Vorsitz: Armin Laschet: *Themendossier Unterbringung und Wohnen von Flüchtlingen: Engpässe überwinden – Kommunen entlasten*, **Januar 2016**

**R6** Forschungszentrums Migration, Integration und Asyl des Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Authors: Andrea Baier, Manuel Siegert): *BAMF-Kurzanalyse: Die Wohnsituation Geflüchteter*, **February/2018** (English Edition) <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-67564-1>

**R7** Robert Bosch Stiftung (Authors: Jutta Aumüller, Priska Daphi, Celine Biesenkamp): *Die Aufnahme von Flüchtlingen in den Bundesländern und Kommunen - Behördliche Praxis und zivilgesellschaftliches Engagement*, **November 2015**

**R8** Alliance 4 Ukraine/ ProjectTogether gGmbH (Authors: Alina Ostkamp and Colleagues): *Gute Lösungen für die Betreuung von Kindern aus der Ukraine - Eine Sammlung von Good Practices*, **Autumn 2022**





## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

**R9** Robert Bosch Stiftung (Author: Rainer Ohliger): *A New Era for Refugee and Asylum Policy? Policy Recommendations for Learning Systems*, **May 2022**

**R10** Bundesministerium für Wohnen, Stadtentwicklung und Bauwesen ([www.bmwsb.bund.de/](http://www.bmwsb.bund.de/))/  
Bündnis Bezahlbarer Wohnraum: *Bündnis bezahlbarer Wohnraum - Maßnahmen für eine Bau-, Investitions- und Innovationsoffensive*, **12/10/2022**

**R11** ifo-Institute (Authors: Katja Michlbauer und Lukas Mergele): *Integrationsperspektive von ukrainischen Geflüchteten im deutschen Schulsystem*, ifo Schnelldienst 8 / 2022, 75. Jahrgang, **10/08/2022**

**R12** Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB) (Author: Herbert Brücker): IAB-FORSCHUNGSBERICHT- Aktuelle Ergebnisse aus der Projektarbeit des Instituts für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung: *Geflüchtete aus der Ukraine: Eine Einschätzung der Integrationschancen*, **April 2022**

**R13** Technische Universität Darmstadt/IWU: *Housing Policies in the EU - Member State: Germany*, Informal Project Document, **2020**

**R14** Empirica: Folgen des Russland-Ukraine-Krieges für den Wohnungsmarkt: Folgerungen (Authors: Prof. Dr. Harald Simons, Marco Schmandt), **March 2022**, available under [https://www.empirica-institut.de/fileadmin/Redaktion/Publikationen\\_Referenzen/PDFs/2022021\\_Folgen\\_Russland\\_Ukraine\\_Wohnungsmarkt.pdf](https://www.empirica-institut.de/fileadmin/Redaktion/Publikationen_Referenzen/PDFs/2022021_Folgen_Russland_Ukraine_Wohnungsmarkt.pdf)

**R15** Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development (2021) *Housing and Property Markets in Germany 2020* (Author: Alexander Schürt), Bonn, **March 2021**

**R16** Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB)/ Bundesinstitut für Bevölkerungsforschung (BiB)/ Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF) Forschungszentrum Migration, Integration und Asyl /Sozio-oekonomisches Panel (SOEP) DIW Berlin: *Geflüchtete aus der Ukraine in Deutschland: Flucht, Ankunft und Leben*, **December 2022**, available under [https://www.diw.de/de/diw\\_01.c.850107.de/projekte/iab-bib/freda-bamf-soep-befragung\\_\\_\\_gefluechtete\\_aus\\_der\\_ukraine\\_in\\_deutschland.html](https://www.diw.de/de/diw_01.c.850107.de/projekte/iab-bib/freda-bamf-soep-befragung___gefluechtete_aus_der_ukraine_in_deutschland.html)

**R17** Kholodilin, K. A., Mense, A., & Michelsen, C. (2016). Market break or simply fake? Empirics on the causal effects of rent controls in Germany. DIW Discussion Papers, No. 1584, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin

### 6.3 IS – International Studies and Reports

**IS1** European Commission of Cities and Regions, COTER commission secretariat: Background note "Impact of the Russian war in Ukraine on accessible and affordable housing in the EU in the context of the EU internal market", Brussels, 29/09/2022

**IS2** IOM UN-Migration: UKRAINE CRISIS 2022: 6 MONTHS OF RESPONSE, Summer 2022

**IS3** OECD Policy Responses: Ukraine tackling the Policy Challenges - Housing support for Ukrainian refugees in receiving countries, 27/07/2022 ([oecd-org.ukraine-hub](http://oecd-org.ukraine-hub))

**IS4** OECD Policy Responses: Ukraine tackling the Policy Challenges - The potential contribution of Ukrainian refugees to the labour force in European host countries, 27/07/2022 ([oecd-org.ukraine-hub](http://oecd-org.ukraine-hub))



## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

**IS5** OECD (2022): *Rights and Support for Ukrainian Refugees in Receiving Countries*, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/09beb886-en>

**IS6** UNHCR – The UN Refugee Agency / Regional Bureau for Europe: *LIVES ON HOLD: INTENTIONS AND PERSPECTIVES OF REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE*, REGIONAL INTENTIONS REPORT # 2, SEPTEMBER 2022

**IS7** McKinsey Global Institute (2017) *Reinventing construction: A route of higher productivity* (Authors: Barbosa, Filipe, Jonathan Woetzel, and Jan Mischke), available under <http://dln.jaipuria.ac.in:8080/jspui/bitstream/123456789/2898/1/MGI-Reinventing-Construction-Full-report.pdf>

**IS8** Habitat for Humanity (2021) *Housing at the Center of Recovery: Building back better through Policies and Systems in the Developing World*, Policy Discussion Brief (Author: Wetzstein, Steffen) available under <https://www.habitat.org/sites/default/files/documents/Housing%20at%20the%20Center%20of%20RecoveryPolicy%20Brief%20Discussion.pdf>

### 6.4 M - Media Communication

**M1** DPA, 24 Aug 2022: *Innenminister: 180.000 Flüchtlinge aus der Ukraine in Bayern*, available under <https://www.msn.com/de-de/nachrichten/politik/innenminister-180-000-fl%C3%BChtlinge-aus-der-ukraine-in-bayern/ar-AA112F4Y?ocid=msedgdhp&pc=U531&cvid=9eaf77a641254d72bac98db95db36543>

**M4** Südwestrundfunk, 15 Sep 2022: *GEMEINDETAG WILL AUSWEITUNG DER MASSNAHMEN, Wohnraum für Geflüchtete - BW stellt 80 Millionen Euro bereit*, available under <https://www.swr.de/swraktuell/baden-wuerttemberg/wohnraumfoerderprogramm-fuer-gefluechtete-startet-100.html>

**M7** Thüringer Ministeriums für Migration, Justiz und Verbraucherschutz, 29 Aug 2022, Pressemitteilung: Kategorie: Bürger, Inklusion, Migranten

**M9** Westfälische Nachrichten, 10 Sep 2022: *Flüchtlinge in Ladbergen: „Situation ist noch mal anders als 2015“*, available under <https://www.wn.de/muensterland/kreis-steynfurt/ladbergen/situation-ist-noch-mal-anders-als-2015-2626994>

**M14** KfW-Bank, 23 March 2022: *KfW stockt Hilfsprogramm für Kommunen zur Unterbringung von Geflüchteten auf 500 Mio. EUR auf*, available under <https://www.presseportal.de/pm/41193/5178160>

**M21** Süddeutsche Zeitung, 3 September 2022: *Geflüchtete in Privatwohnungen: Vier Wochen sollten sie bleiben – eigentlich: Wohnungssuche bleibt für ukrainische Geflüchtete schwierig*, available under <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/muenchen/ukraine-krieg-gefluechtete-wohnung-sowon-1.5650050>

**M22** Estate Agent Today, 14 March 2022: *Second Homeowners urged to take in Ukrainian Refugees*, available under <https://www.estateagenttoday.co.uk/breaking-news/2022/3/second-home-owners-urged-to-take-in-ukrainian-refugees>

**M23** Die Welt, 24 November 2022: *Wohnen wird für alle teurer – die wahren Verlierer der Immobilienkrise*, available under <https://www.msn.com/de-de/finanzen/top-stories/wohnen-wird-f%C3%BCr-alle-teurer-die-wahren-verlierer-der-immobilienkrise/ar-AA14uadx?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=592a1d1a594e4a27c101376c160abadf>



## Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

**M24** Der Tagesspiegel, 9 May 2022: Günstiger als Hotels zu mieten: Berliner Senat will Wohnungen für Geflüchtete bauen, available under <https://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/berliner-senat-will-wohnungen-fur-gefluchtete-bauen-8020369.html>

**M25** Das Handelsblatt, 25 Nov 2022: Bauministerkonferenz: 30.000 Euro mehr für ein normales Einfamilienhaus – Bauindustrie befürchtet massiven Konjunkturunbruch, available under <https://www.msn.com/de-de/finanzen/top-stories/bauministerkonferenz-30-000-euro-mehr-f%C3%BCr-ein-normales-einfamilienhaus-bauindustrie-bef%C3%BCrchtet-massiven-konjunkturunbruch/ar-AA14xkHW?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=f674a10a33554105e247ea8a27536130>

**M26** Das Abendblatt, 2 October 2019: Neue Strategie „Sozial gerechte Bodenpolitik für Hamburg“ beschlossen – ‚Sozialklauseln‘ sollen Verdrängung verhindern, available under <https://www.abendblatt.de/hamburg/article227258079/Warum-der-Senat-auf-Erbpacht-setzt.html>

**M27** BR24 – NEWS, 30 Nov 2022: Herrmann sieht Kommunen bei Flüchtlingsaufnahme am Limit, available under <https://www.br.de/nachrichten/meldung/herrmann-sieht-kommunen-bei-fluechtlingsaufnahme-am-limit,300526051>

**M28** Juraforum, 20 November 2022: Darf der Staat Flüchtlinge in Privatwohnungen einweisen? available under [https://www.juraforum.de/news/darf-der-staat-fluechtlinge-in-privatwohnungen-einweisen\\_247740](https://www.juraforum.de/news/darf-der-staat-fluechtlinge-in-privatwohnungen-einweisen_247740)

**M29** Staatsministerium Baden-Württemberg, 19 October 2022, Prämienanreize für Kommunen sollen Wohnraum schaffen, available under <https://stm.baden-wuerttemberg.de/de/service/presse/pressemitteilung/pid/praemienanreize-fuer-kommunen-sollen-wohnraum-schaffen/>

### 6.5 W – Additional Website/Social Media Links

**W1** Blog/Gesis/org

### 6.6 A – Academic Publications

**A1** Kofner, S. (2017) Social Housing in Germany: an inevitably shrinking Sector. *Critical Housing Analysis*, 4(1), 61-71

**A2** Wetzstein, S. (2017) The global urban housing affordability crisis. *Urban Studies*, 54 (14), 3159-3177

**A3** Payne, G. and Durand-Lasserve, A. (2012) Holding on: security of tenure-types, policies, practices and challenges. Research Paper for expert group meeting on Security of Tenure convened by the special UN rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context, Raquel Rolnik

**A4** Knoll, K., Schularick, M. and Steger, T. (2017) No price like home: Global house prices, 1870-2012. *American Economic Review*, 107(2), 331-53

**A5** Aalbers, M. (2016) *Financialization of Housing*, London: Routledge

**A6** Malpass, P. (2011) Path dependence and the measurement of change in housing policy. *Housing, Theory and Society*, 28(4), 305-319



**Research on Long-term Housing of Ukrainian Refugees in Europe**  
commissioned by Habitat for Humanity International

**A7** Krapp, M. C., Vaché, M., Egner, B., Schulze, K., and Thomas, S. (2020) *Housing policies in the European Union*. Institut Wohnen und Umwelt GmbH: Darmstadt, Germany

**A8** Wetzstein, S. (2021) Assessing post-GFC housing affordability interventions: a qualitative exploration across five international cities. *International Journal of Housing Policy*, 21(1), 70-102

**A9** Griesbeck, M. (2007) Integration als gesamtgesellschaftliche Aufgabe und die Integrationsaufgabe des Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge. *Bildung und Erziehung*, 3, 273–281

**A10** Kohl, S. (2016) Urban history matters: Explaining the German–American homeownership gap. *Housing Studies*, 31(6), 694-713